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Abstract
This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained
duopoly supergames. In each period ¯rms simultaneously set a price-quantity
pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the ¯rm is
willing to sell at this price. Under price-quantity competition ¯rms are able
to ration their output below capacity. For a wide range of capacity pairs, the
equilibrium path providing the smaller ¯rm with its highest stationary per-
fect equilibrium payo® requires that it undercut its rival's price and ration
demand. Furthermore, for some capacities and discount factors supporting se-
curity level punishments, price shading and rationing arise everywhere on the
set of stationary perfect equilibrium paths yielding (constrained) Pareto opti-
mal payo®s. That is, price shading may not only be consistent with successful
collusion, it may be a requirement of successful collusion.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in price setting duopoly supergames
with capacity constrained ¯rms and constant unit costs of production up to capacity.
In contrast to standard Bertrand-Edgeworth supergame models,1 following Dixon
(1992) we assume that in each period ¯rms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair
specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the ¯rm is willing to
sell at this price.2
In one-shot simultaneous move capacity constrained games, modifying Bertrand-
Edgeworth (B-E) competition to allow for simultaneous price-quantity choice is in-
nocuous. Simultaneous price-quantity games yield equilibria that are equivalent to
the B-E equilibria: ¯rms' equilibrium expected payo®s and distributions of prices
and sales are the same under the two game forms (assuming an equal sharing rule
when both ¯rms price at unit cost and have capacities su±ciently large to gener-
ate the classical Bertrand equilibrium). One implication of this result is that the
equilibrium behavior of real market variables, such as quantities produced and sold,
prices, and pro¯ts in B-E and price-quantity games, is indistinguishable for any ¯nite
number of repetitions.
Price-quantity supergames are di®erent.3 In these games, the ability of ¯rms to
ration their output below capacity when they are low-priced helps relax incentive
constraints in maintaining collusive behavior. Indeed, for a wide range of discount
factors and asymmetric capacity pairs, the equilibrium path providing the smaller
¯rm with its highest stationary perfect equilibrium payo® requires that it undercut
its rival's price and ration consumers by setting a bound on its sales below both its
demand and capacity. In fact, for some capacities and discount factors supporting se-
curity level perfect equilibrium punishments, asymmetric pricing and rationing arise
everywhere on the set of stationary perfect equilibrium paths yielding constrained
Pareto optimal payo®s.
The price-quantity approach to modeling collusion has important implications
for business strategy and antitrust and regulatory policy. Historically, price shading
by smaller ¯rms has often been interpreted as a signal of the breakdown of attempts
to collude (see, for instance, Stigler (1964)). Our results demonstrate that, contrary
to conventional wisdom, asymmetric pricing and endogenous rationing of consumers
by a small ¯rm are behaviors consistent with, and sometimes required by, tacitly or
overtly collusive behavior in an intuitive non-cooperative game theoretic model of
1See, for instance, Davidson and Deneckere (1984, 1990), Brock and Scheinkman (1985), Benoit
and Krishna (1987, 1991), Lambson (1987, 1994, 1995), and Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002).
2This commitment to a quantity is made without incurring production costs. Costly production
takes place \to order," only after the price- and ceiling-determined sales are realized.
3Capacity constrained price-quantity games di®er from price setting games for other extensive
forms as well. For instance, in the case where ¯rms move sequentially, the two are not generally
equivalent.
2long run market interaction.
Rees (1993) applies Bertrand-Edgeworth supergames to analyze data from the
Great Salt Duopoly in the UK in the 1980's. Rees claims that the data rule out
one-shot Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium pricing behavior and concludes that the
discount factors prevalent in the market were su±cient to support pure strategy
collusive outcomes. However, he observes that in the Duopoly during this period the
small ¯rm's price was slightly below the large ¯rm's and the small ¯rm had a higher
capacity utilization than the large ¯rm.4 We provide calculations of the extent of
price dispersion in our model that are consistent with Rees's observations. Depending
on the discount factor, on the perfect equilibrium path that maximizes the small
¯rm's payo®, price dispersion can be as high as 16% of the price-cost margin. We
also show that our model can generate patterns of capacity utilization on constrained
Pareto optimal stationary perfect equilibrium paths that are consistent with Rees's
observations and di®er from those arising under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.
For example, for a su±ciently low discount factor, even if the large ¯rm's capacity
is just su±cient to serve the whole market at a price equal to marginal cost, in the
price-quantity model the small ¯rm may have a higher degree of capacity utilization
than the large ¯rm. This is impossible under Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.
In our model, rationing arises endogenously in a tacitly collusive pure strategy
perfect equilibrium of an in¯nitely repeated game with complete information. This
is in contrast to the previous literature on endogenous rationing which relies upon
either incomplete information, as in Allen and Faulhaber (1991), DeGraba (1995)
and Gilbert and Klemperer (2000), or some form of power to precommit in price, as
in the sequential price setting models of Boyer and Moreaux (1988, 1989).
Our result is reminiscent of the logic of \judo economics" examined by Gelman
and Salop (1983). In that paper, a unit cost advantaged incumbent is initially
endowed with su±cient capacity to serve the entire market. A potential entrant
moves ¯rst, deciding upon the amount of capacity to install and then its price, acting
as a price leader. The incumbent then acts as a price follower. Although Gelman and
Salop do not derive the entrant's optimal capacity choice explicitly, they do show
that it is optimal for the entrant to choose a capacity and price that will deter the
incumbent from undercutting or matching its price. The entrant remains small in
order to avoid an aggressive price response from a more e±cient incumbent.
Similar behavior also arises in the model of Allen, Deneckere, Faith and Kovenock
(2000). They show that, for certain regions of cost (including regions where the
second mover in capacity is more e±cient), sequential capacity choice followed by
simultaneous price setting leads to a unique perfect equilibrium in which the capacity
follower sets a relatively small capacity and the equilibrium in the price setting stage
is in non-degenerate mixed strategies. In the price setting subgame, the small ¯rm
4In the Great Salt Duopoly, the small ¯rm is British Salt and the large ¯rm is ICI Weston Point.
3has a lower expected price than the large ¯rm.
Our paper obtains a \judo" outcome without an unrealistic exogenous sequencing
of prices or use of non-degenerate mixed pricing strategies. We maintain a simul-
taneous move structure embedded in an in¯nitely repeated game and focus on pure
strategy equilibria. A small ¯rm reduces price and restricts its output below capac-
ity, not as a result of preemption by a larger ¯rm, but rather to avoid the defection
of the larger ¯rm from a collusive agreement and its resulting punishment. That is,
judo behavior may be consistent with overtly or tacitly collusive behavior.
Our approach also addresses a potential weakness in the Bertrand-Edgeworth
supergame literature. In that literature ¯rms can collude in price but cannot collude
(or even coordinate) in determining market shares. In much of the literature these
shares are exogenously ¯xed. Lambson (1994) and Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002)
relax this assumption by allowing ¯rms to coordinate by endogenously sharing de-
mand at identical prices, (but not at di®erent prices). This has proven useful: when
compared to exogenous sharing rules, endogenous sharing at identical prices facili-
tates both collusion along the initial path and the sustainability of symmetric price
punishment paths, by allowing market shares to vary to balance the ¯rms' incentives
to cheat.
Even with endogenous sharing of demand at identical prices, there is a sense in
which capacity is asked to do too much work in Bertrand-Edgeworth supergames. It
serves to allocate market share in a collusive phase (at least at asymmetric prices)
and determines the ability to punish following a deviation from that phase. Price-
quantity games separate out these two functions by allowing quantity choice to de-
termine the market sharing rule while leaving capacity as the measure of a ¯rm's
ability to punish. The qualitatively rich set of empirical implications of the price-
quantity model relative to the B-E model serves as an illustration of the danger of
asking a single strategic variable (in this case capacity) to do too much. This is in
stark contrast to the spirit of the Kreps-Scheinkman (1983) analysis, which shows
that a reduced form (quantity setting) may serve as an accurate proxy for a more
complicated game with multiple strategic variables.
Another weakness of the Bertrand-Edgeworth approach is its reliance on subop-
timal punishment paths to punish deviations from the collusive phase. For instance,
in their analysis of the e®ect of mergers on the ability to collude, Compte, Jenny
and Rey use endogenous sharing rules on symmetric price paths. However, imposing
symmetry of punishment price paths is not without loss of generality and there is
no reason to believe that such paths constitute optimal punishments. One might
expect a restriction to symmetric equilibria to substantially reduce the ability to
sustain collusion, especially in situations in which ¯rms di®er considerably in size.
Indeed, one conclusion of Compte, Jenny and Rey's analysis is that asymmetry in
¯rm size reduces the ability to collude. In this paper, we examine the class of simple
penal codes having punishments with a 2-phase structure. Given such penal codes,
4security level punishments can be supported in a perfect equilibrium for a wider
range of capacities and discount factors under price-quantity competition than un-
der B-E competition. On the perfect equilibrium security level punishment paths we
construct, ¯rms set asymmetric prices in the ¯rst period of punishment. Moreover,
when capacities are asymmetric, our 2-phase punishment paths punish deviations
at least as severely, and sometimes strictly more severely, than the 2-phase pun-
ishment paths and the proportional penal codes of Lambson (1994), the symmetric
paths of Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) and the grim trigger strategy of reverting
to the one-shot Nash equilibrium (Davidson and Deneckere (1984, 1990), Brock and
Scheinkman (1985), Benoit and Krishna (1987, 1991)).
The formulation of our component game as one in which each ¯rm sells at the price
it announces is equivalent to a \pay-as-bid" auction, which is currently a popular
tool in the analysis of electricity and other power markets. Our analysis therefore
has direct and immediate implications for the nature and sustainability of collusion
in \pay-as-bid" auctions in these markets. Another auction form common both in
practice and the theoretical analysis of power markets is the uniform price auction.
Although we do not analyze in¯nitely repeated uniform price auctions in this paper,
the usefulness of the price-quantity approach extends to uniform price auctions as
well.5
Section 2 introduces the cost and demand conditions employed in this paper
and the basic simultaneous move price-quantity model that we have developed. An
equivalence result is derived showing that for the relevant cost and demand struc-
tures the one shot equilibrium of the price-quantity game coincides with that of
a corresponding B-E game. Section 3 introduces our price-quantity supergame and
Section 4 characterizes the Pareto set within the set of stationary perfect equilibrium
paths assuming security level punishments. In Section 5, we examine the class of
simple penal codes having punishments with a 2-phase structure. We show that for
a wide range of capacities, discount factors, and unit costs, relevant for the analysis
in Section 4, perfect equilibrium 2-phase punishment paths exist and achieve the
security level for both ¯rms. Section 6 addresses the implications of our model for
price dispersion and capacity utilization on the Pareto set of stationary perfect equi-
librium paths. Section 7 concludes by showing that all of the behaviors described in
this paper arise as subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes when there is endogenous
choice of capacity.
5Preliminary analysis of repeated uniform price-quantity auctions, which perhaps better describe
actual uniform price electricity auctions than, say, the B-E approach employed by Fabra (2002), Le
Coq (2002) and Crampes and Creti (2002), indicates that such auctions may yield higher collusive
equilibria than uniform price auctions in a B-E setting.
52 One-period simultaneous move game
2.1 The price-quantity game




M if p · 1;
0 otherwise.
The ¯rms face capacity constraints ki, i = 1;2 with k1 ¸ k2, and each incurs a
constant unit cost of production c, 0 · c · 1, up to its capacity. Thus, if ¯rm i
realizes sales si, its cost of production is ci(si) = csi for si · ki. Output greater
than ki is in¯nitely costly. To simplify notation, we de¯ne a ¯rm's e®ective capacity,
^ ki ´ minfki;Mg.
Assuming box demand allows us to abstract from issues related to the use of a
particular rationing rule. For example, both the e±cient and proportional rationing
schemes de¯ne the same residual demand for ¯rm i, M ¡ ^ kj.
In the component game, G(k1;k2;c), ¯rms simultaneously set price and quantity
pairs (pi;qi) where qi is interpreted as a credible pre-commitment not to produce an
output greater than qi. Firm i's strategy set is the set of the price-quantity pairs
Si = f(pi;qi) : pi · 1 and qi 2 [0;ki]g.6 Note that we do not a priori rule out
prices below cost but, without loss of generality, assume that no ¯rm will ever set
a price beyond the choke price. In the continuation, let ^ qi = minfqi;Mg be the
e®ective maximum quantity ceiling of i. Let Mi denote the set of mixed strategies
(probability measures on the ¾¡algebra of Borel-Lebesgue measurable sets of Si).
For a given pair of pure strategies (p1;q1);(p2;q2), ¯rm i's sales are given by the
function si : Si £ S¡i ! [0;ki], i = 1;2, where
si(p1;q1;p2;q2) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
^ qi if pi < pj;pi · 1;
minf^ qi;
^ qiM
^ q1+^ q2g if pi = pj · 1;
minf^ qi;M ¡ ^ qjg if 1 ¸ pi > pj;
0 otherwise:
This assumes that in the event of a tie in prices, the ¯rms sell their quantity ceiling,
unless the sum of ceilings exceeds demand. In this case, demand is allocated in
proportion to the the e®ective maximum quantity ceilings ^ qi, i = 1;2. Given this
mapping from the vector of ¯rms' price-quantity pairs to e®ective sales, ¯rm i's pro¯t
is:
¼i(pi;qi;pj;qj) = (pi ¡ c)si(pi;qi;pj;qj):
This pro¯t function may be extended in a natural way to an expected pro¯t function
on Mi £ M¡i. For any triple (k1;k2;c), the component price-quantity setting game
6Because of the strict capacity constraint, the restriction qi 2 [0;ki] also coincides with the no
bankruptcy constraint of Dixon (1992).
6is then a normal form game ¡(k1;k2;c) with players i = 1;2, strategy sets M1, M2,
and expected payo® functions ¼i(¹1;¹2).







It is simple to compute ¼i by noting that for any given strategy by ¯rm j, ¯rm i can
guarantee itself a payo® at least as great as (1¡c)(M¡^ kj) by setting (pi;qi) = (1;^ ki)
with probability one. If ¯rm j sets pj = c and qj = kj, the most ¯rm i can obtain is
(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ kj), which is the minmax pro¯t ¼i.
2.2 The simultaneous move equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive an equivalence result showing that every equilibrium of
the component price-quantity game coincides with an equilibrium of a corresponding
one-shot B-E game and vice-versa. That is, ¯rms' equilibrium expected pro¯ts and
distributions of prices and sales are the same under the two game forms.
Ghemawat (1986) has shown that the B-E price-setting game, GE(k1;k2;c) has
a unique equilibrium for any triple (k1;k2;c). Assuming without loss of generality
that k1 ¸ k2, if k2 ¸ M, the unique equilibrium in the game is p1 = p2 = c and
¼1 = ¼2 = 0. By convention, demand is shared equally.7 If k1 + k2 > M > k2,
the only equilibrium exhibits non-degenerate mixed strategies and ¯rm i's expected
pro¯t is ¼i =
^ ki
^ k1(1¡c)(M¡k2). If k1+k2 · M, the unique equilibrium is p1 = p2 = 1
and ¼i = (1 ¡ c)ki, i = 1;2.
To demonstrate the equivalence of the B-E equilibrium and the set of equilibria
in the simultaneous move price-quantity game ¡(k1;k2;c), we ¯rst develop some
notation. For any ¹i 2 Mi, de¯ne ¹
p
i to be the marginal distribution of ¯rm i's price
associated with the strategy ¹i. That is ¹
p
i is the projection of ¹i onto the set of
prices. De¯ne li and ui to be the greatest lower bound and the least upper bound
of ¹
p
i, i = 1;2, respectively. Moreover, de¯ne °
¹
i (p) = fq 2 [0;ki]j(p;q) 2 supp(¹i)g,
where supp(¹i) denotes the support of the probability measure ¹i.
Proposition 1 For every (k1;k2;c), GE(k1;k2;c) and ¡(k1;k2;c) have identical equi-
librium distributions of pro¯ts, prices and sales.
The proof of Proposition 1, which is relegated to the Appendix, is intuitive. The price
and sales distribution of the unique equilibrium of the B-E game must clearly arise
as one possible equilibrium outcome of the price-quantity game. If both ¯rms o®er
their capacity for sale at any price they may set, then the B-E price distributions are
7Our analysis assumes that in the case in which ki ¸ M, i = 1;2, ¯rms share demand equally
in the B-E equilibrium, p1 = p2 = c. If this sharing rule is not employed, only equilibrium prices
and pro¯ts need coincide in this case.
7best-responses to each other for these quantities. Since no single ¯rm can increase
its pro¯t by o®ering a lower quantity, a strategy in the price-quantity game in which
the marginal price distribution is the B-E price distribution and the capacity level
is the only quantity in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium strategy for
each ¯rm.
Moreover, in any equilibrium of the price-quantity game, a ¯rm would always lose
sales with positive probability if its quantity at any price in its support is strictly
lower than capacity unless (i) it has a capacity ki ¸ M and qi ¸ M, or (ii) its price
is undercut by the other ¯rm with probability 1 and its quantity qi is greater than or
equal to residual demand M ¡ qj. Hence setting a quantity strictly below capacity
cannot be part of a best response to the other ¯rm's strategy unless one of these two
cases holds or the ¯rm's price is at or below unit cost.
Setting price below unit cost is clearly not equilibrium behavior in the price-
quantity game. From dominance arguments similar to those used in the B-E game,
unless capacities are in the classical Bertrand region (ki ¸ M, i = 1;2), unit cost is
also not an element of the equilibrium price distribution in the price-quantity game.
An argument very similar to that for B-E competition shows that unit cost pricing is
the unique equilibrium price pair in the price-quantity game when capacities are in
the classical Bertrand region. This, however, clearly requires that qi ¸ M. Otherwise
j would have incentive to raise price above unit cost, so there is no di®erence between
the price-quantity equilibrium in this case and the B-E equilibrium.
Hence, the only potential source of di®erences in the equilibria of the B-E game
and the price-quantity game appears in cases (i) and (ii) above. However, in neither of
these cases do the relevant quantities set a®ect either the ¯rms' sales or incentives to
deviate. Since quantities set below capacity in a manner that a®ects sales cannot be
part of an equilibrium strategy in the price-quantity game, and quantities set below
capacity that do not a®ect sales also have no e®ect on the incentive to deviate, it
follows that for every triple of capacities and marginal cost, every equilibrium of
the price-quantity game generates the same price and sales distributions as the B-E
game.
3 The price-quantity supergame
In this section, we examine the supergame G±(k1;k2;c) obtained by in¯nitely repeat-
ing the one shot game G(k1;k2;c) and discounting payo®s with discount factor ± < 1.






pure strategy ¾i for ¯rm i is a sequence of functions, f¾i(t)g1
t=0, such that for every t,













up to time t. A strategy pro¯le is a vector ¾ = (¾1;¾2). Each strategy pro¯le gener-
ates an in¯nite path ¿(¾). Firm i's normalized discounted value from period s along





t=0 is given by:













We refer to Vi(¿;t) for t = 1;2;3::: as ¯rm i's continuation value at t. We let
Vi(¿) ´ Vi(¿;0) denote the payo® associated with the entire path.
Following Abreu (1988), we de¯ne a simple strategy pro¯le ¾(¿0;¿1;¿2), where ¿0
is the initial path, and ¿i is a punishment path started if player i unilaterally deviates
from the ongoing prescribed path, i = 1;2. A simple penal code is a vector of simple
strategy pro¯les (¾1(¿1;¿1;¿2);¾2(¿2;¿1;¿2)). Letting ~ Vi(¾i(¿i;¿1;¿2)) ´ Vi(¿i), an
optimal penal code is a vector of strategy pro¯les (¾1;¾2) such that ¾i is a perfect
equilibrium of the supergame and ~ Vi(¾i) = min¾f~ Vi(¾)j¾ is a perfect equilibriumg.
Note that an optimal penal code may not exist. If an optimal penal code exists, then
we refer to ~ Vi(¾i) as the worst punishment value for ¯rm i.
A security level punishment for ¯rm i is a punishment path on which ¯rm i
obtains the discounted sum of its minmax pro¯t, equal to ¼i in normalized terms.
A security level penal code is a penal code that contains security level punishment
paths for both ¯rms. Since the minmax payo® is the lowest payo® a ¯rm can be held
to in the supergame, if there exists a security level penal code then it is an optimal
penal code.
4 Constrained Pareto optimal paths and collusion
In the following sections, we assume k1 ¸ k2 and focus on the area in capacity space
where k1+k2 > M. The last restriction is without loss of generality since k1+k2 · M
implies that the one-shot Nash equilibrium payo®s are Pareto optimal. If an optimal





t=0 is a perfect
equilibrium if and only if it is sustainable by (V 1;V 2) that is, for every i;j, i 6= j
and every t:

































In our model, ¯rm i's optimal deviation pro¯t is obtained by either slightly under-
cutting pt
j · 1 and o®ering its whole capacity for sale, or by charging the monopoly




j) = maxf(1 ¡ c)(M ¡
8If pt
j > 1, ¯rm i's optimal deviation is to o®er its capacity for sale at a price of 1. It then
obtains a payo® equivalent to what it would receive by slightly undercutting pt
j = 1. If ¯rm j
9^ qt
j);(pt
j ¡ c)^ kig. Hence there exists a set Ai such that if (pj;qj) 2 Ai then ¯rm i's
optimal deviation is to slightly undercut and o®er its capacity.
Ai =
(
(pj;qj) 2 Sjj^ qj ¸ M ¡





i be the unique price such that (p;^ kj) = 2 Ai for all p < p
i. p
i is the highest
price p such that if j o®ers its capacity for sale at p, ¯rm i ¯nds it most pro¯table to
charge the monopoly price on its residual demand and o®ering any quantity between
residual demand and its capacity.
From (2), it follows that along any stationary perfect equilibrium path (SPEP)
f(p1;q1;p2;q2)g supported by perfect equilibrium security level punishment paths,
the following incentive constraints must be satis¯ed:9
(p1 ¡ c)s1(p1;q1;p2;q2) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)¼
¤
1(p2;q2) + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2); (4)
(p2 ¡ c)s2(p1;q1;p2;q2) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)¼
¤
2(p1;q1) + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1): (5)
(4) and (5) state that the payo® a ¯rm obtains along a stationary path must be
larger than the one-period deviation pro¯t plus the punishment value.
We now state several de¯nitions and an assumption that we will use throughout
the rest of the paper.
De¯nition 1 (PO) A SPEP ¿p is a Constrained Pareto Optimal path if there is no
SPEP ¿0 such that Vj(¿0) ¸ Vj(¿p) for all j and Vi(¿0) > Vi(¿p) for some i.
De¯nition 2 (C) A path ¿c is a collusive path if each ¯rm receives a payo® on ¿c
that is at least as great as the discounted sum of its one-shot Nash equilibrium payo®
and at least one ¯rm receives a strictly greater payo®.




2)g is a path exhibiting symmetric
pricing if on ¿sp, pt
1 = pt
2, 8t.
Assumption 1 (A1) There exist pure strategy perfect equilibrium security level pun-
ishment paths for both ¯rms.
If a SPEP satis¯es (C), then s2(p1;q1;p2;q2) ¸ ®N
2 ´
(M¡^ k2)^ k2
^ k1 : If not, then for
every price vector, ¯rm 2 receives a payo® lower than the discounted sum of its one-
shot Nash equilibrium payo®. Note that (PO) does not imply (C), nor does (C) imply
(PO). For example, if the stationary path f(1;q1;1;M ¡ q1)g is a SPEP, it satis¯es
charges pt
j > 1, then it obtains a zero payo® and ¯rm i's deviation pro¯t is maximized. Firm j
could also secure a zero payo® by setting qt
j = 0 and charging any price less than 1, thereby reducing
¯rm i's deviation pro¯t without a®ecting its payo®.
9When we focus on stationary paths, we drop the time superscript.
10(PO), but it does not satisfy (C) if q1 > M ¡ ®N
2 . If the path f(1;M ¡ ^ k2; ~ p;^ k2)g is
a SPEP, it satis¯es (C) as long as ~ p > p
2, but in general, it does not satisfy (PO) if
~ p < 1. In section 6, we show that A1 is satis¯ed for a wide range of parameter values
by constructing perfect equilibrium punishment paths with a 2-phase structure along
which both ¯rms receive their security level.
Many papers note that in the classical B-E supergame, sustainable stationary
collusive price paths involve symmetric pricing because symmetric pricing minimizes
¯rms incentives to deviate along stationary paths (see Davidson and Deneckere, 1990,
for example). Under B-E competition, with asymmetric pricing, the sales of the
¯rm with the highest price are such that its discounted pro¯t along any sustainable
asymmetric stationary path is at or below the discounted sum of its one-shot Nash
equilibrium pro¯t. Sustainability requires that the lower price be such that the high-
priced ¯rm has no incentives to undercut, but this requires that the low-priced ¯rm
receives no more than the discounted sum of its Nash-equilibrium payo®. Therefore,
there are no sustainable stationary paths with asymmetric pricing yielding collusive
payo®s in the sense of (C). The ability to ration output at any price provides a
pro¯t sharing mechanism in price-quantity supergames that is not available in B-E
supergames. The intuition behind Proposition 2 below is that it may be optimal for
a ¯rm to lower its price below that of its rival in order to lower the rival's deviation
pro¯t, and at the same time, ration its output so as to limit the decrease in the
rival's sales. However, a ¯rm that lowers its price and rations its output should sell a
su±ciently large quantity that it does not ¯nd it pro¯table to raise price to slightly
undercut the high-priced ¯rm.
As a benchmark, we provide the following lemma, which states that if A1 holds
and ¯rms price symmetrically along a constrained Pareto optimal SPEP yielding








~ ±. The lemma characterizes such paths. The proof of the lemma appears in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose A1 holds. If there exists a SPEP ¿s = f(p1;q1;p2;q2)g satisfying
(PO) and (SP) then q1 + q2 ¸ M and pi = 1, i = 1;2. Such a ¿s exists if and only
if ± ¸ 1








If ± ¸ 1
2, there is a range of possible divisions of the market that can be supported
as a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (SP). The quantities ®i and ®i de¯ned below provide
lower and upper bounds on ¯rm i's sales on SPEP's satisfying (PO) and (SP). De¯ne
the quantities ®i(±) and ®i(±) as follows:
®i(±) ´ (1 ¡ ±)^ ki + ±(M ¡ ^ kj);
®i(±) ´ (1 ¡ ±)(M ¡ ^ kj) + ±^ ki:
11for i = 1;2 j 6= i. For ± ¸ 1
2, ®i(±) ¸ ®i(±), i = 1;2. If A1 is satis¯ed, ®i(±) is the
minimum quantity ¯rm i can be allocated for its incentive constraint to be satis¯ed
when both ¯rms set a price equal to 1. Similarly, ®i(±) is the maximum quantity
¯rm 1 can be allocated for ¯rm j's incentive constraint to be satis¯ed when both
¯rms set a price equal to 1. It is clear that ®i(±) = M ¡ ®j(±), i = 1;2, i 6= j.
To simplify notation, we also de¯ne the maximum incentive compatible quantity
¯rm 2 can be allocated when ¯rm 1 sets p1 = 1 and ¯rm 2 sets p2 < 1:
®2(p2) = M ¡
(1 ¡ ±)(p2 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2)
1 ¡ c
: (6)
The following proposition assumes pure strategy security level punishments exist and
support a SPEP satisfying (PO), (C) and (SP) (from Lemma 1). The proposition
shows that relaxing the assumption (SP) expands the set of collusive (C) constrained
Pareto optimal (PO) SPEP's to include paths on which the small ¯rm undercuts
the large ¯rm by setting a price lower than 1. In these equilibria, the small ¯rm
endogenously rations its output below its capacity.
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c = f(q1;q2) 2 £i=1;2[0;ki] jq1 + q2 ¸ M;si(1;q1;1;q2) ¸ ®i(±); i=1,2
and s2(1;q1;1;q2) ¸ ®
N
2 :g:
The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix. Several implications are
worth emphasizing. First, note that in any SPEP described by the proposition, each
¯rm has sales constrained strictly below capacity. Furthermore, when ± is such that
± < ±r ´
2^ k1¡M
2^ k1+^ k2¡M, the set P c
2 of SPEP prices for the small ¯rm is a non-degenerate
interval.
Under B-E competition, the set of stationary Pareto optimal paths consists of
those paths along which both ¯rms set p1 = p2 = 1. Since ¯rms set the same price,
assuming that side-payments are not feasible, they share collusive pro¯ts according
to a given sharing rule. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Since pricing
symmetrically at the monopoly price yields the largest industry pro¯t, if there exists
12a division of the market for which the monopoly price is sustainable, the resulting
payo®s are constrained Pareto optimal. However, if the large ¯rm has a binding
incentive constraint at the monopoly price, it is necessary for the small ¯rm to lower
its price in order to relax this constraint. For payo®s to remain on the constrained
Pareto frontier, the small ¯rm's sales must increase more than proportionally (to the
price cut) in order for its pro¯t to increase. However, the small ¯rm's sales must
be strictly below its capacity to guarantee that the large ¯rm's sales are su±cient
for it to conform to the prescribed path. If the small ¯rm's sales are equal to its
capacity, incentive compatibility implies that the price it charges must be equal to
p
1, i.e., the Nash equilibrium payo®s are on the constrained Pareto frontier. But
Nash equilibrium payo®s cannot be on the constrained Pareto frontier if ± ¸ ~ ±, since
a SPEP exists which satis¯es p1 = p2 = 1, (PO) and (C).
If ± 2 [~ ±;±r), in the constrained Pareto optimal SPEP that provides the small ¯rm
its maximum pro¯t, the small ¯rm undercuts the large ¯rm and rations its output
below its capacity. The intuition behind the fact that only the small ¯rm optimally
lowers its price and rations its output is simple. The small ¯rm has an incentive to
set a price di®erent from the large ¯rm's price if it can increase its pro¯t compared
to what it obtains by charging the same price. The maximum pro¯t the small ¯rm
can attain on a path satisfying (SP) is V2 = (1¡c)®2(±). If the small ¯rm undercuts
the large ¯rm's price by an in¯nitesimal amount ², but its sales do not change, its
pro¯t decreases by an amount equal to ²®2(±). However, the large ¯rm's incentive to
deviate decreases as well. The amount by which the large ¯rm's incentive constraint
is relaxed is equal to ²(1¡±)^ k1. Therefore, ¯rm 2's sales can increase by an amount
equal to
²(1¡±)^ k1
1¡c while still satisfying ¯rm 1's incentive constraint. If ¯rm 2 adjusts
the quantity it o®ers to sell exactly ®2(±) +
²(1¡±)^ k1
1¡c when it undercuts p1 = 1 by
², the ¯rst order e®ect on its pro¯t is ²[(1 ¡ ±)^ k1 ¡ ®2(±)], which is strictly greater
than zero if ± < ±r. Applying the same reasoning to the large ¯rm, we conclude
that the large ¯rm has an incentive to undercut p2 = 1 and ration its output only if
(1 ¡ ±)^ k2 > ®1(±). However, this inequality does not hold for any ± ¸ ~ ±.
We de¯ne the constrained Pareto optimal SPEP on which ¯rm i's pro¯t is max-
imized by:
¿i(±) = argmax¿fVi(¿)j¿ stationary;(4);(5);A1;(PO) and (C) holdg:
Proposition 2 ensures that ¿i(±) is well-de¯ned for every ± ¸ ~ ±. Proposition 3 follows
directly from Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Suppose A1 holds. If ± 2 [~ ±;±r), then on ¿2(±), the SPEP on which
the small ¯rm's pro¯t is maximized, the small ¯rm charges a price p¤
2 lower than
the monopoly price and rations its output below its capacity. The large ¯rm charges
the monopoly price (which equals the residual monopoly price) and serves residual
13demand. If ± ¸ maxf~ ±;±rg, then any SPEP satisfying (PO) also satis¯es (SP).
~ ± < ±r if and only if ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 .
Proof. Note that from Proposition 2, on every SPEP satisfying (PO) and (C),
¯rm 1 sets a price equal to 1. From the de¯nition of ±r, it follows from Proposi-
tion 2 that if ± ¸ maxf~ ±;±rg holds, minfp¤
2;1g = 1. Therefore P c
2 = f1g, hence,
it follows from Proposition 2 that any SPEP satisfying (PO) and (C) also satis¯es
(SP). Assume for now that the interval [~ ±;±r) is nonempty and that ± 2 [~ ±;±r).
It follows that p¤
2 < 1. To prove Proposition 3, we show that if ± is in [~ ±;±r),
¿2(±) = ¿¤
2(±) ´ f(1;M ¡®2(p¤
2));p¤
2;®2(p¤
2))g. To this e®ect, note that M ¡®2(p) is
a strictly increasing function of p. Hence, (1¡c)(M ¡®2(p)) > (1¡c)(M ¡®2(p¤
2))
for all p 2 (p¤
2;1]. We now show that ¿¤
2(±) = ¿2(±). Suppose to the contrary that
¿2(±) = ^ ¿ ´ f(1;q1;p;q2)g where p 2 (p¤
2;1]. Then by de¯nition of ¿2(±), V2(^ ¿) ¸
V2(¿¤
2(±)). But from Proposition 2, since ^ ¿ is a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (C),
V1(^ ¿) = (1¡c)s(1;q1;p;q2) ¸ (1¡c)(M ¡®2(p)) > (1¡c)(M ¡®2(p¤
2)) = V1(¿¤
2(±)).
Hence V2(^ ¿) ¸ V2(¿¤
2(±)) cannot hold, otherwise ¿¤
2(±) does not satisfy (PO), a con-
tradiction to Proposition 2. Hence, it must be that ¿¤
2(±) = ¿(±). This implies that
on the path ¿2(±), ¯rm 2 sets a price equal to p¤
2, which is strictly less than 1. From
Proposition 2, it also follows that ¯rm 1 sets a price equal to 1 and serves residual
demand. Finally, using the de¯nitions of ±r and ~ ±, straightforward calculations yield
~ ± < ±r if and only if ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 . ¤
One implication of Proposition 3 is that symmetric ¯rms (indeed, ¯rms with
identical e®ective capacities) never charge di®erent prices along constrained Pareto
optimal SPEP's, since ^ k1 = ^ k2 implies ^ k1 ·
M+^ k2
2 .
Propositions 2 and 3 can be used to construct Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates the
constrained Pareto frontier of payo®s attainable along stationary perfect equilibrium
paths for capacity pairs satisfying ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 and discount factor ± 2 [1
2;±r). Firm
1's normalized supergame payo® is indicated on the horizontal axis and ¯rm 2's on
the vertical axis. Firm 1's maximum payo® is attained on a path satisfying (SP)
and is equal to (1 ¡ c)®1(±). Firm 2's payo® is then equal to (1 ¡ c)®2(±). The
slope of the constrained Pareto frontier is ¡1 as (SP) implies that all payo®s on that
portion of the frontier are obtained by transferring sales from one ¯rm to the other
at p1 = p2 = 1. The point ((1¡c)®1(±);(1¡c)®2(±)) represents the maximum pro¯t
level for ¯rm 2 which can be supported on a SPEP satisfying (SP).
As shown in Proposition 3, if ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 and ± 2 [1
2;±r), ¯rm 2 can attain
higher pro¯t levels by undercutting ¯rm 1. An implication is that the constrained
Pareto frontier becomes non-linear.10 Intuitively, on that portion of the frontier,
10Formally, an implication of Proposition 2 is that all (V1;V2) on the constrained Pareto frontier
such that V1 < (1 ¡ c)®1(±) must satisfy V1 = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®2(p2)) and V2 = (p2 ¡ c)®2(p2)
for p2 2 Pc
2. Using the expression for ®2(p2) given by (6) and solving for p2 as a function of V1
14as V1 decreases, all payo®s are obtained by transferring sales from the large ¯rm
to the small ¯rm, but at a decreasing price for the small ¯rm. Alternatively, note
that ¯rm 2's payo® on SPEP's satisfying (PO) in which ¯rm 2 undercuts ¯rm 1
is a non-linear function of ¯rm 2's price. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 2
that for SPEP's satisfying (PO) and on which ¯rm 2 undercuts ¯rm 1, the price set
by ¯rm 2 determines each ¯rm's payo® uniquely. Therefore any change in ¯rm 2's
price consistent with ¯rms' payo®s remaining on the constrained Pareto frontier has
a non-linear e®ect on ¯rm 2's payo®, implying that the constrained Pareto frontier
is non-linear.
If ± < ~ ±, Lemma 1 implies that there is no sustainable stationary path satisfying
both (PO) and (C) on which ¯rms set the same price. However, if ~ ± · ± < ±r, there
exist constrained Pareto optimal SPEP yielding collusive payo®s on which the small
¯rm sets a price less than 1, and the large ¯rm sets its price equal to 1. Proposition
4 establishes that there is a range of discount factors below ~ ± for which there exist
SPEP's satisfying (PO) and (C) on which the small ¯rm undercuts the large ¯rm
and rations its output below its capacity.
Proposition 4 Suppose A1 holds. If ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 , there exists a ^ ± < ~ ±, such that for
every ± 2 (^ ±; ~ ±), there exists a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (C). Furthermore on any
such SPEP the small ¯rm charges a price lower than the monopoly price and rations
its output below its capacity. The large ¯rm charges the monopoly price (which equals
the residual monopoly price) and serves residual demand.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the assumption ± < ~ ± implies that there exists no SPEP of
the form f(1;q1;1;q2)g satisfying (PO). Moreover, since ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 by assumption,
it follows from Proposition 3 that ~ ± < ±r. Thus, by de¯nition of ±r, if ± < ~ ±, the set
[p¤
2;1) is non-empty. We show that there exists ^ ± < ~ ± such that for all ± > ^ ±, there
exists a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (C) satisfying the requirements of the proposition.
If ± = ~ ±, from Propositions 2 and 3, the path ¿¤




satis¯es (PO), (C) and maximizes ¯rm 2's payo®. This implies that the following
holds: V2(¿¤
2(~ ±)) = p¤
2®2(p¤
2) > (1¡c)®2(~ ±) = (1¡c)maxf®N
2 ;®2(~ ±)g, where the last
equality follows from the de¯nitions of ~ ±, ®2(±), ®2(±) and ®N
2 . Thus by the de¯nition
of ®2(±), if ± = ~ ±, then on ¿¤
2(~ ±), (5) is not binding, that is:
V2(¿
¤
2(~ ±)) > (1 ¡ ~ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ~ ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1):
Now, de¯ne the function D(d) = V2(¿¤
2(d))¡(1¡d)(1¡c)^ k2¡d(1¡c)(M ¡^ k1). Note
that this function is strictly increasing in d because V2(¿¤
2(d)) is increasing in d and
yields p2 =
V1¡±(1¡c)(M¡^ k2)











(1¡c)(1¡±)^ k1 , which is less than zero, greater
than ¡1, and decreasing in V1, for all SPEP payo®s V1 satisfying (PO) and (C).
15^ k1+^ k2 > M. Let ^ ±0 be equal to minfd 2 Rj0 < d < ~ ± and D(d) = 0g if such number
exists and to 0 otherwise. Then, if ± > ^ ±0, D(±) ¸ 0. Therefore, by de¯nition of
D(±), (5) holds on ¿¤
2(±). Using the de¯nition of M ¡®2(p2), it is clear that (4) also
holds on ¿¤
2(±). It remains to show that ¿¤




2 if and only if ± > ^ ±00 ´
M¡2^ k2
M¡^ k2 . Straightforward computations
yield ^ ±00 < ~ ± for all (k1;k2) satisfying our assumptions. Letting ^ ± ´ maxf^ ±0; ^ ±00g, for
± 2 (^ ±; ~ ±), ¿¤
2(±) is a SPEP that satis¯es (PO) and (C). ¤
Proposition 4 states that if ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 , then there exists a SPEP ¿ satisfying
(PO) and (C) for ± in an interval below ~ ±. Such a SPEP cannot satisfy (SP) as we
have shown in Lemma 1. The implication of Proposition 4 is that if the larger ¯rm
is su±ciently large, then asymmetric pricing and endogenous rationing by the small
¯rm arise everywhere on the set of SPEP satisfying (PO) and (C). Note that such
SPEP do not exist under B-E competition, since they rely on the ¯rms' ability to
ration output even when their prices di®er.
5 Security level penal codes
It is well understood that in price-setting games with capacity constraints, including
the price-quantity game analyzed in this paper, the grim trigger strategy of reverting
to the one-shot Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies) does not constitute an optimal
punishment for the small ¯rm for a wide range of discount factors and capacity pairs.
We have shown that in the region of capacities where the classical B-E equilibrium
is in non-degenerate mixed strategies, the small ¯rm receives a payo® that strictly
exceeds its minmax payo® in the equilibrium of the one-shot game. In the symmetric
B-E supergame, Lambson (1987) shows that if there exists a worst pure strategy
perfect equilibrium punishment, then it is a security level punishment for both ¯rms.
In the asymmetric B-E supergame, Lambson (1994) shows that if there exists a worst
pure strategy perfect equilibrium punishment, then it is a security level punishment
for the large ¯rm.11 However, it need not be the case for the small ¯rm. Whenever
they exist, perfect equilibrium strategies generating security level punishment paths
for both ¯rms constitute an optimal penal code, since no ¯rm can be held down to
a value strictly lower than its minmax payo®.
Abreu (1986) introduced the notion of a 2-phase punishment path. Following
Abreu (1986), we call a 2-phase punishment path a path which is stationary after the
¯rst period. Despite the fact that these paths do not generally possess the optimality
11Lambson's analysis focuses, like ours, on pure strategies only. It is clear that if one allows for
mixed strategies in the supergame, then repeating the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever achieves
the worst punishment for the large ¯rm.
16properties in our game that they have in the Abreu analysis,12 their application here
is compelling. First, they are computationally tractable and include grim-trigger
strategies as a special case. Second, they allow for more severe punishments than,
and therefore improve upon, other punishments applied in the B-E literature (for
a wide range of parameter values). We show that for a wide range of capacities,
discount factors, and unit costs, perfect equilibrium 2-phase punishment paths exist
and achieve the security level for both ¯rms.
For ± ¸ 1
2, optimal punishments within the class of 2-phase punishments have
the following properties. If k2 is su±ciently large, in the ¯rst period of the small
¯rm's punishment path, the small ¯rm o®ers and sells its whole capacity at a low
price, possibly below unit cost. The large ¯rm o®ers its capacity and sells an amount
equal to its residual demand at the highest price that does not provide the small
¯rm an incentive to deviate. The second phase consists of the constrained Pareto
optimal SPEP (supported by security level punishments) along which the small ¯rm
obtains its lowest payo®. For smaller values of k2, the ¯rms' roles are reversed in
the ¯rst period. The large ¯rm o®ers and sells its whole capacity at the lowest
price consistent with its incentive constraint being satis¯ed. The small ¯rm o®ers its
capacity, but sells to residual demand, at a price strictly above its rival's. From the
second period on, ¯rms revert to a stationary path satisfying (PO) which satis¯es
the following properties: the small ¯rm obtains its security level on the entire path
and all incentive constraints are satis¯ed in every period.
For ± ¸ 1
2, the large ¯rm's punishment path in an optimal 2-phase punishment
takes two di®erent forms. For a given discount factor, if the small ¯rm's capacity is
relatively low, in the ¯rst period, the large ¯rm sets the highest price that does not
provide the small ¯rm an incentive to deviate, o®ers its capacity and sells to residual
demand. In the ¯rst period, the small ¯rm sets a lower price than the large ¯rm,
o®ers and sells its capacity. Firms then revert to a second phase in which the large
¯rm may obtain more than its lowest constrained Pareto optimal SPEP payo®. If
the small ¯rm's capacity is su±ciently large, the form of the large ¯rm's punishment
path is similar that of the small ¯rm's. In the ¯rst period, the small ¯rm o®ers
its capacity at the highest price that does not provide the large ¯rm an incentive to
deviate and sells to residual demand. The large ¯rm sets a lower price, possibly below
unit cost, o®ers and sells its capacity. The second phase consists of the constrained
Pareto optimal SPEP on which the large ¯rm obtains its lowest payo®.
We focus on stationary paths on which ¯rms charge the same price for the second
phase. We will see that for ± ¸ 1
2, this is without loss of generality because the
binding constraint is the large ¯rm's constraint along the small ¯rm's punishment
path. Proposition 2 implies that for SPEP's supported by security level punishments,
12Later in this section, we construct a numerical example of a three-phase perfect equilibrium
punishment path that supports a security level punishment for the small ¯rm when the 2-phase
path fails to achieve the security level for the small ¯rm.
17the large ¯rm obtains its largest pro¯t on SPEP's on which p1 = p2 = 1. Therefore,
a second phase along which ¯rms charge di®erent prices would be more di±cult to
sustain.
Let ± ¸ 1
2 and let ¿p ´ f(1;q1;1;q2)g be a constrained Pareto optimal SPEP
supported by security level punishment paths. In the ¯rst phase of its punishment,
let ¯rm 2 charge a price ps
2 such that the following equality is satis¯ed:
(1 ¡ ±)(p
s
2 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)s2(1;q2;1;q1) = ¼2: (7)
Since ¿p is a SPEP, s2((1;q2;1;q1)) > M ¡ ^ k1. It follows from (7) that ps
2 < p
2.
Therefore if the punishing ¯rm, 1, sets p1 = p
2, it sells to residual demand. Therefore,
the only condition that needs to be satis¯ed for the 2-phase path to be sustainable
is:
(1 ¡ ±)(p
2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) + ±(1 ¡ c)s1(1;q2;1;q1) ¸ ¼1: (8)
Using this simple structure, we now show that the large ¯rm is able to punish devi-
ations by the small ¯rm as harshly as possible for a large set of capacity pairs. In
Proposition 5 below we characterize a su±cient condition under which the small ¯rm
may be held down to its security level in a 2-phase perfect equilibrium punishment.
In our characterization, (8) is the binding constraint.
Note however that in the above formulation of the small ¯rm's punishment, we
do not a priori rule out negative or below cost pricing. While we believe that there
may be conditions under which such pricing policies are relevant, before proceeding
to Proposition 5, we ¯rst provide conditions on the parameters that insure that
punishment prices do not become negative as ± approaches 1 (and therefore for all
±). To this e®ect, suppose that for ± ¸ 1





2 = c +
(1 ¡ c)[(M ¡ ^ k1) ¡ ±®2(±)]
(1 ¡ ±)^ k2
:
Taking the derivative of ps
2 with respect to ±, it is straightforward to show that ps
2 is









2 = ¡(1 ¡ c)
Ã




The above limit is greater than or equal to zero if and only if:




M ¡ ^ k1
2(^ k1 + ^ k2 ¡ M)
> 0:
We will maintain this assumption on unit cost in Proposition 5, although it can be
removed if we allow for negative prices. The proof of the proposition appears in the
Appendix.
18Proposition 5 Assume ± ¸ 1






, there exists a pure strategy perfect equilibrium path ¿s
i along
which ¯rm i obtains its security level, i = 1;2.13
Our analysis of 2-phase punishment paths in price-quantity supergames generates
security level punishments for a larger range of parameters than previous treatments
of 2-phase punishment paths of B-E supergames. This arises for several reasons.
First, when compared to 2-phase punishments in B-E supergames with a ¯xed sharing
rule, the ability to ration output at any given price in price-quantity supergames
allows for a higher payo® for the large ¯rm along the constrained Pareto optimal
SPEP constituting the second phase of the small ¯rm's punishment. This, in turn,
relaxes the large ¯rm's incentive constraint in the ¯rst period of the small ¯rm's
punishment path.
Although previous B-E supergame analyses with endogenous sharing rules apply
a second phase of punishment that coincides with that employed here, we also intro-
duce two di®erent types of ¯rst phase of punishment not previously analyzed in the
literature. In our analysis, if the small ¯rm's capacity is su±ciently large, the ¯rst
phase of ¯rm i's punishment requires that ¯rm j set the lowest price greater than
or equal to p
i that satis¯es j's incentive constraint, and sell its e®ective capacity,
^ kj. For smaller values of ¯rm 2's capacity, in the ¯rst phase of ¯rm 1's punishment,
¯rm 1 sets a price equal to p
2, ¯rm 2 sets a price below ¯rm 1's price and both
¯rms o®er their capacity. These ¯rst phases of punishment, which are also feasible in
the B-E supergame, improve upon the 2-phase punishments proposed by Lambson
(1994) and Compte, Jenny, and Rey (2002), which require that punishing ¯rms set
price equal to unit cost.14
In our analysis, the set of capacity pairs for which perfect equilibrium security
level 2-phase punishment paths can be constructed for both ¯rms becomes smaller
as ± decreases. This can be easily seen by noting that ª(k1;±) is a non-decreasing
function of ±. For ± < 1
2, Lemma 1 shows that the paths satisfying (SP) used in
the second phase of the punishment paths constructed in Proposition 5 cannot be
supported by security level punishment paths. However, from Proposition 4, for
± 2 (^ ±; 1
2) and ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 , constrained Pareto optimal SPEP's in which the small
¯rm undercuts the large ¯rm and rations its output can be supported by security
level punishment paths. Moreover, in the limit as delta approaches 1
2 from below, the
large ¯rm's payo® on its most favorable such path is arbitrarily close to the payo®
it obtains on ¿
p
1. Therefore, if additionally ^ k2 > ª(^ k1;±) holds, by using this path
in the second phase of the small ¯rm's punishment path, the large ¯rm's incentive
13We may remove the assumption c ¸ ^ c if we allow for negative prices.
14In Lambson the punished ¯rm sets a price lower than the punishing ¯rm, while in Compte,
Jenny and Rey all ¯rms set a price equal to zero, which is both the unit cost and the lower bound
of the one-shot strategy space.
19constraint in the ¯rst phase of the small ¯rm's punishment path is satis¯ed. Hence,
there exists a region of capacity space for which 2-phase security level punishment
paths can be constructed for both ¯rms in a range of discount factors below 1
2. That
is, perfect equilibrium 2-phase security level punishment paths can be supported in
price-quantity supergames for values of the discount factor for which they fail to
exist in Bertrand-Edgeworth supergames.
In the next proposition, we show that the set of capacity pairs for which an
optimal penal code is a security level penal code for both ¯rms can be extended
further. In Proposition 5 above, we showed that 2-phase punishment paths can be
constructed if ± ¸ 1
2 and k2 ¸ ª(k1;±). One characteristic of such punishments is
that the large ¯rm sets a higher price than the small ¯rm in the ¯rst period and
sells to residual demand. Below, we construct 2-phase punishment paths in the ¯rst
period of which the small ¯rm sets a higher price than the large ¯rm. The large ¯rm
o®ers and sells its whole capacity at a price that keeps the small ¯rm from deviating.
The small ¯rm o®ers its capacity but sells to residual demand only at a price that
keeps the large ¯rm from deviating. Then ¯rms revert to a stationary path of the
form f(1;q1;1;q2)g, where q1 + q2 = M, in which the quantity ceilings are such that
given the ¯rst period prices, the small ¯rm's payo® on the entire path is equal to
its security level and no ¯rm has an incentive to deviate. A di±culty we did not
encounter in Proposition 5 arises when constructing this type of path. When the
large ¯rm's capacity is close to M, a pair of ¯rst phase prices satisfying the incentive
constraints and the requirement that the small ¯rm obtains its security level does
not exist. Such prices exist only if k1 < [1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ±)]M.
Note also that in Proposition 6, we assume ^ k2 < ª(k1;±) so that the set of
capacity pairs we characterize complements the set characterized in Proposition 5.
This allows us to show straightforwardly and without additional assumption that all
prices are non-negative on the paths we construct.
Proposition 6 Assume ± ¸ 1













· ^ k2 < ª(k1;±),
there exists a pure strategy perfect equilibrium path ¿s
i along which ¯rm i obtains its
security level, i = 1;2.
We have shown that punishment paths that become stationary after the ¯rst pe-
riod are optimal for a large set of parameters. However, we have constructed examples
in which the 2-phase paths above are not optimal. One example constructed includes
a non-stationary constrained Pareto optimal second-phase that exhibits price shad-
ing and rationing. This suggests that paths with a simple structure in which the
20punished ¯rm obtains a very low pro¯t in the ¯rst period before reverting to a
constrained Pareto optimal path exist and are optimal, at least for a range of pa-
rameters.15 It also suggests that optimal punishment paths in price-quantity games
that do not have a 2-phase structure are generally not replicated by B-E punishment
paths. Characterizing such punishment paths entails characterizing the entire set of
non-stationary constrained Pareto optimal perfect equilibrium paths, which remains
a topic for future research.
6 Empirical implications
6.1 Price dispersion
Under price-quantity competition, the main departure from results obtained under
B-E competition is the possibility of price dispersion in a pure strategy collusive
equilibrium. In Proposition 2, we computed p¤
2, the minimum price set by the small
¯rm on a constrained Pareto optimal SPEP. Since the large ¯rm sets a price equal
to 1, we de¯ne the maximum level price dispersion on a constrained Pareto optimal
SPEP to be:
¢(±;k1;k2) = 1 ¡ minfp
¤
2;1g:
From Propositions 3 and 4, we have that ¢(±;k1;k2) > 0 if and only if ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2
and ± 2 (^ ±;±r). Moreover, using the expression for p¤
2 in Proposition 2, it is clear
that the maximum level of price dispersion increases as k2 and ± become small and as
^ k1 becomes large. Thus, price dispersion consistent with e®ective collusion is more
likely to be observed in markets characterized by substantial size asymmetries. Table
1 displays values of p¤
2 for various values of k2 and ±.16
As an example of price shading arising on every constrained Pareto optimal SPEP,
for ± = 0:49 and k2 = 700, pc
2, the small ¯rm's price in a constrained Pareto optimal
SPEP must lie in the interval [0:9025;0:9266]. The interval vanishes to a single point
as k2 increases.
Anecdotal evidence presented in Rees's (1993) analysis of the Great Salt Duopoly
indicates that British Salt (BS), the smallest of the two ¯rms, quoted prices per ton
15In this example, we set M = 100, k1 = 70, k2 = 200
3 , c = 0:5 and ± = 1
2. For these parameters,
¯rm 1's constraint is binding in every period of ¯rm 2's punishment path, ¿
sp
2 , de¯ned in Proposition
5. It is possible to show that a non-stationary path with (0:94;1;59:65;40:35) as prices and quotas
o®ered in the ¯rst period and the SPEP ¿1(1
2) starting in the second period exists and is a perfect
equilibrium. Moreover, on this non-stationary path, ¯rm 1's pro¯t is higher than on ¿1(1
2), the
stationary perfect equilibrium path on which ¯rm 1's pro¯t is maximized if ± = 1
2. Therefore using
this path as a second phase of ¯rm 2's punishment relaxes ¯rm 1's constraint in the ¯rst period.
16The missing values correspond to values of the parameters for which we do not construct perfect
equilibrium security level punishment paths for both ¯rms.
21(k2, ±) 0.5 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.65
500 - - - - 0.9447 0.9785
570 - - 0.9361 0.9565 0.9790 1
670 0.9010 0.9177 0.9775 1 1 1
770 0.9310 0.9502 1 1 1 1
Table 1: p¤
2 for various values of ± and k2, setting M = ^ k1 = 1000 and c = 0:4.
to its large customers below those quoted by the largest ¯rm, ICI Weston Point
(WP), by roughly 0:25%. Firms' capacities were such that WP could supply to the
whole market at marginal cost (k1 ¸ M) except in 1980 and BS could supply to
approximately two-thirds of the market (k2 ¼ 2
3M). In our model, these capacities
are such that price shading and endogenous rationing by the small ¯rm arise on
constrained Pareto Optimal SPEP's for su±ciently low discount factors (see Table
1). Moreover, despite the slight price di®erence, BS never operated at full capacity
over the period of time examined by Rees, as is consistent with our endogenous
rationing result.
6.2 Capacity utilization
Rees (1993) and Lambson and Richardson (1994) use ¯rm-level data and a Bertrand-
Edgeworth supergame approach to study the ability to collude in two di®erent in-
dustries. They both provide data regarding the degree of capacity utilization during
collusive periods. In Rees's study of the Great Salt Duopoly, the small ¯rm used a
signi¯cantly greater percentage of its capacity in collusive periods than did the large
¯rm. In Lambson and Richardson's study of the US passenger car market, the large
¯rm had a higher rate of capacity utilization than the small ¯rm during the collusive
periods.
For some values of the parameters, our model has implications regarding capacity
utilization that di®er from those obtained under standard B-E competition. For the
B-E supergame, Lambson (1994) shows that if each ¯rm's incentive constraint is
binding along a collusive SPEP satisfying (SP) supported by optimal penal codes
and the large ¯rm's capacity is less than demand at the common price, the large ¯rm
must have a higher capacity utilization than the small ¯rm.
In Lemma 3 in section 8.6 in the Appendix, we show that for ± ¸ ~ ±, if the large
¯rm's capacity is not su±cient to serve the whole market, the large ¯rm always has
a higher capacity utilization than the small ¯rm along the path that maximizes the
large ¯rm's payo®. However, the analogous statement for ¯rm 2 is true only for a
subset of discount factors. We show that if ¯rm 1 is large relative to ¯rm 2, but not
necessarily larger than the market size, the small ¯rm has a higher capacity utilization
22on the SPEP that maximizes its pro¯t for values of the discount factor close to 1
or close to ~ ±. The intuition is outlined below and illustrated in Figure 2. Figure
2 shows the range of ¯rm 1's sales on stationary constrained Pareto optimal SPEP
also satisfying (C) when
M+k2
2 < k1 · minf2k2;Mg and A1 is satis¯ed. For such
capacity pairs, ~ ± = 1
2 < ±r holds. That is, there exists a range of discount factors for
which constrained Pareto optimal SPEP include endogenous rationing. The ¯gure
is drawn showing ¯rm 1's sales. The corresponding ¯gure for ¯rm 2 is obtained by
noting that s2 = M ¡ s1. For discount factors close to 1, the worst sustainable
constrained Pareto optimal path for the large ¯rm, f(1;®1(±);1;M ¡®1(±))g is such
that it sells an amount close to residual demand after the small ¯rm has sold its
capacity. In this case, the small ¯rm uses almost 100% of its capacity and has higher
capacity utilization than the large ¯rm. As the discount factor decreases, ®1(±)
increases so that eventually, the large ¯rm has higher capacity utilization than the
small ¯rm. Since the conditions in Proposition 3 are satis¯ed, for discount factors
in the interval [~ ±;±r), on the constrained Pareto optimal SPEP that maximizes its
payo®, the small ¯rm undercuts the large ¯rm. For such discount factors, the small
¯rm's sales increase as the discount factor decreases. If ¯rm 1 is su±ciently large,
but not necessarily larger than M, there exists a level of ± below which the small
¯rm has a higher capacity utilization than the large ¯rm.
An implication of the above is that in price-quantity supergames, if the large ¯rm
is large enough, but not necessarily larger than the market size, at the critical value
of the discount factor for which each ¯rm's incentive constraint is binding, the small
¯rm has a higher capacity utilization than the large ¯rm. For that value of ±, on all
constrained Pareto optimal SPEP's, the small ¯rm sets a lower price than the large
¯rm and rations its output below capacity. Thus, such paths are not feasible under
B-E competition.
7 Conclusion
In contrast to the previous literature on collusion, this paper shows that price shading
by a small ¯rm may not only be consistent with successful collusion, it may be
required. In the context of a capacity constrained price-quantity supergame, we
show that collusion may be characterized by endogenous rationing and stable price
dispersion.
Our analysis has been carried out taking capacities parametrically. A natural
question arising in this context is whether the capacity pairs that are applied in our
analysis arise endogenously in a game of simultaneous or sequential capacity choice
followed by our capacity-contingent price-quantity supergame.
Consider ¯rst the dynamic game in which ¯rms simultaneously build capacities.
Following Benoit and Krishna's (1991) analysis of a dynamic Bertrand-Edgeworth
23duopoly, assume that ¯rms do not randomize in the supergame except possibly to
play the one-shot Nash equilibrium. Suppose also that the discount factor is in the
range ± ¸ ~ ±. Then, for capacity pairs satisfying the conditions of Propositions 5 or 6,
the worst subgame equilibrium for ¯rm i is one in which it obtains its security level.
On the other hand, since ± ¸ ~ ±, Proposition 2 implies that for such capacity pairs
there exists a stationary perfect equilibrium path (SPEP) satisfying (PO) and (C).
Furthermore, for capacity pairs that do not satisfy the conditions in either Proposi-
tion 5 or 6, the worst equilibrium yields a payo® no greater than the discounted sum
of the one-shot Nash equilibrium payo®.
We claim that if ± ¸ ~ ±, (k¤
1;k¤
2) is a capacity pair that satis¯es the conditions in
either Proposition 5 or 6, and the cost of capacity is zero or is negligible, the following
strategy forms a subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game: \Set (k¤
1;k¤
2) in
the ¯rst stage and play a SPEP that satis¯es (PO) and (C) in the price-quantity
supergame. If ¯rm i deviates at the capacity stage to set kd
i 6= k¤
i, revert to the
path ¿s
i , on which ¯rm i obtains its security level if such a path exists for capacities
(kd
i;k¤
¡i). Otherwise, revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategies forever." It
is simple to check that all unilateral deviations in capacity from the above strategy




Note also that the result holds whether the choice of capacity is made simultane-
ously or sequentially. It relies solely on ¯rms' ability to punish deviations from the
equilibrium capacity pair (k¤
1;k¤
2) by imposing a payo® for the deviating ¯rm that




Proposition 7 Assume that the unit cost of capacity is zero or is negligible. If
± ¸ ~ ±, every capacity pair for which there exist pure strategy perfect equilibrium
security level punishment paths for both ¯rms can be supported in a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the dynamic game of either simultaneous or sequential capacity choice
followed by the capacity constrained price-quantity supergame.
The implication of this result is immediate. All of the behaviors described in this
paper arise in some subgame perfect equilibrium when there is endogenous choice of
capacity.
17First, kd
i must be such that kd
i + k¤
¡i ¸ M, otherwise, ¯rm i could increase its payo® by
increasing kd
i slightly. Then, ¯rm i's optimal deviation yields a payo® equal to either the security





discounted sum of ¼N




i . Since the payo® from conforming is
greater than or equal to both the security level and the discounted sum of ¼N
i evaluated at (k¤
i ;k¤
¡i),
it follows from the fact that the security level and ¼N
i are non-decreasing in ki that the payo® from
conforming is greater than the payo® from deviating.
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268 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (©¤
1;©¤












i (p) = ki, 8p 2 supp(¹
¤p
i ), i = 1;2, is an








j (p) = kj 8p 2 supp(¹
¤p
j ). Suppose ¹0
i is
a best-response for ¯rm i, j 6= i in the game ¡(k1;k2;c). Clearly, for any p ¸ c,
¯rm i's expected payo® setting °
¹0
i




i (p) = qi < ki. To see this, note that for any realization of pj,




i (p) = ki
cannot lower ¯rm i's expected pro¯t. However, since (©¤
1;©¤
2) is a B-E equilibrium,





i (p) = ki 8p 2 supp(¹
p
i) i = 1;2, provides
an expected payo® to ¯rm i that is at least as great as any other distribution ~ ¹i
such that °
~ ¹i





i (p) = ki
8p 2 supp(¹i) is a best-response to ¹¤
j and the underlying distributions over sales





2) is an equilibrium of the price-quantity game ¡(k1;k2;c). We will
break down the analysis for di®erent regions of the capacity space.
Suppose ¯rst that k1 + k2 > M > k1. By examination, it is clear that for every
pi, pj, qj and qi < ki, si(pi;ki;pj;qj) ¸ si(pi;qi;pj;qj) with equality only if pi > pj
and M ¡ qj · qi. Hence for any price pi, ¯rm i would strictly increase its expected
pro¯t ¼i by increasing its quantity from qi to ki unless pi · c, or pi > pj almost
everywhere with respect to ¹j and M ¡ qj · qi almost everywhere with respect to
¹j. A strict dominance argument rules out pi · c in the support of ¹i. If there
exists a ^ pi 2 supp(¹
¤p
i ), such that 9qi 2 °
¹¤
i
i (^ pi) with qi < ki and satisfying ^ pi > pj,
a.e. ¹j, and M ¡ qj · qi, a.e. ¹j, then let ~ ¹i be an element of Mi such that ~ ¹i
coincides with ¹¤
i for all prices p 6= ^ pi and °
~ ¹i
i (^ pi) = ki. ~ ¹i achieves the same expected
payo® and distribution of sales as ¹¤
i against ¹¤
j. Furthermore, ¹¤
j remains a best
response against ~ ¹i since only the incentives to set prices pj ¸ ^ pi have been altered,
and the payo® from these prices has decreased. Similarly, ¯rm j's expected payo®
and distribution of sales are unaltered against ~ ¹i. This demonstrates that ~ ¹i is a
best response to ¹¤
j and ¹¤




j (p) 6= kj, 8p 2 supp(¹¤
j), then we may construct a measure ~ ¹j coinciding
with ¹¤
j for all prices except possibly some ^ pj de¯ned analogously to ^ pi. Such a ~ ¹j
remains a best response to ~ ¹i and achieves the same expected payo® and distribution
of sales as ¹¤
j. Furthermore, ~ ¹i remains a best response against ~ ¹j. Since °
~ ¹i
i (p) = ki,
8p 2 supp(~ ¹
p




2) must be the (unique)
B-E equilibrium price distributions. Hence, (¹¤
1;¹¤
2) generate the same equilibrium
payo®s, and price and sales distributions as the unique equilibrium of GE(k1;k2;c).
27Arguments for the range of capacities k1 ¸ M > k2 are similar to those above,
except that quantities qi such that k1 ¸ q1 ¸ M are payo® and distributionaly
equivalent to k1.
The case k1 +k2 · M is trivial since in the price-quantity game, (pi;qi) = (1;ki)
is a strictly dominant strategy.
Suppose k1 ¸ k2 ¸ M. From the above arguments, if qi 2 °
¹¤
i
i (p), then qi ¸ M
except possibly for p · c or some p = ^ pi such that ^ p is undercut with certainty by
¯rm j. Suppose c 2 supp(¹
¤p
j ). Then ¼¤
j = 0, which implies that Pr¹¤
i(pi · p) = 1,
8p > c. But this implies that ui = c and therefore uj · c, since otherwise there would
exist a p > c such that E¹¤
j¼i(p;qi;pj;qj) > 0. Hence c 2 supp(¹
¤p
j ) implies ui;uj · c.
It is obvious that li = lj = c since, otherwise, one ¯rm would either sell a positive
amount at prices less than c or sell nothing at these prices (qi = 0). Selling a positive
amount at prices less than c is clearly not equilibrium behavior. Setting prices below
c with positive probability but selling nothing would imply that the rival could sell to
a positive residual demand at a price above c with positive probability, contradicting
ui · c, i = 1;2. Hence c 2 supp(¹
¤p
j ) implies u1 = u2 = l1 = l2 = c, which yields the
immediate conclusion that every qi 2 °
¹¤
i
i (c) satis¯es qi ¸ M, i = 1;2, which is the
B-E result.
Suppose c = 2 supp(¹
¤p
j ), j = 1;2. By arguments similar to those above, we can
rule out either ¯rm pricing below c with positive probability. (Clearly setting (pi;qi)
such that pi < c and qi > 0 is not part of equilibrium behavior. If ¯rm i sets
prices below c with positive probability but sets qi = 0, then ¯rm j has positive
residual demand with positive probability, and hence will set prices bounded above
c. This would allow ¯rm i to undercut j's support and earn a positive pro¯t, again




i (p), which implies that qi ¸ M, except possibly for some ^ p such that ^ p is
undercut with probability 1 by j 6= i. Suppose ui = uj = u. Clearly, both ¯rms ¯rms




qi ¸ M, i = 1;2, and there would be incentive to undercut u slightly. If only one ¯rm
has positive mass at u, that ¯rm is undercut with certainty at u and faces zero residual
demand there. It therefore earns zero equilibrium expected pro¯t, which contradicts
li;lj > 0. Hence neither ¯rm can place mass on fug £ [0;ki]. But this implies that
qi ¸ M, 8qi 2 °
¹¤
i
i (p) and 8p 2 supp(¹¤





again a contradiction to lj > 0.
If ui > uj, i 6= j, it is clear that the above considerations imply that ¼¤
i = 0, again,
a contradiction to li > 0. Hence we cannot have an equilibrium with c = 2 supp(¹¤
j)
for some j. ¤
288.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We ¯rst demonstrate that if there exists a SPEP ¿s = f(p1;q1;p2;q2)g satisfying (PO)
and (SP), then q1 + q2 ¸ M and pi = 1, i = 1;2. First, (SP) implies p1 = p2 = ~ p for
some ~ p. There are three possible cases: (i) (~ p;qj) 2 Ai for i = 1;2, (ii) (~ p;qj) = 2 Ai
for one and only one i, and (iii) (~ p;qj) = 2 Ai for i = 1;2.
In case (i), since A1 holds, the incentive constraints (4) and (5) may be written
as follows:18
(~ p ¡ c)[si(~ p; ~ p;q1;q2) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)^ ki] ¸ ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k¡i); i = 1;2: (9)
We ¯rst show that within the class of pricing policies satisfying (SP), the incentive
constraints are never tightened by setting p1 = p2 = 1. From ±(1¡c)(M ¡^ kj) ¸ 0, it
follows that if si¡(1¡±)^ ki < 0, either (9) does not hold or ~ p < c, both contradicting
SPEP. If i is such that si ¡(1¡±)ki = 0, (9) implies that k¡i ¸ M. If k¡i ¸ M and
ki < M then for j 6= i, ±(1¡c)(M¡k¡j) > 0. But then, (9) implies sj¡(1¡±)kj > 0,
so that the LHS of (9) is strictly increasing in ~ p. Therefore setting ~ p = 1 relaxes
¯rm j's incentive constraint without a®ecting ¯rm i's. If k¡i ¸ M i = 1;2, and
si ¡ (1 ¡ ±)ki = 0, then setting ~ p = 1 does not a®ect the incentive constraint of
any ¯rm. Finally, si ¡ (1 ¡ ±)ki > 0 i = 1;2 implies that the LHS of (9) is strictly
increasing in ~ p, so that setting ~ p = 1 relaxes each ¯rm's incentive constraint. Since
setting p1 = p2 = 1 never tightens the incentive constraints, it is easy to see that in
all cases setting ~ p < 1 contradicts (PO).
In case (ii), let ¯rm n be this ¯rm for which (~ p;q¡n) = 2 An. Since A1 holds, ¯rm
n's incentive constraint may be written as follows:
(~ p ¡ c)sn ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ q¡n) · ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k¡n): (10)
Using the same type of arguments as for case (i), (~ p¡c)sn ¡(1¡±)(1¡c)(M ¡ ^ q¡n)
contradicts the fact that ¿s is a SPEP. If (~ p ¡ c)sn ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ q¡n) = 0,
then (10) implies k¡n ¸ M. Since the LHS of (10) is strictly increasing in ~ p, setting
~ p = 1 relaxes (10). Arguments developed for case (i) show that setting ~ p = 1 relaxes
the other ¯rm's incentive constraint, given by (9) for i 6= n, as well. Again, setting
~ p < 1 would contradict (PO).
The proof for case (iii) follows directly from case (ii). This completes the proof
that if ¿s is SPEP satisfying (PO) and (SP), then p1 = p2 = 1.
We now show that p1 = p2 = ~ p = 1 on a SPEP ¿s implies that (1;qj) 2 Ai i = 1;2
j 6= i. Suppose (1;qj) 6= Ai for some i;j. Then it follows from (3), the de¯nition of
Ai, that qj < M ¡ ^ ki, from which it follows that ¼j(1;1;qi;qj) < ¼j, a contradiction
to SPEP.
18Where no confusion is possible, we drop the argument out of si(~ p; ~ p;q1;q2) for notational
convenience.
29Next we show that if ¿s satis¯es (PO) and (SP), it must be the case that q1+q2 ¸
M. Suppose f(1;q1;1;q2)g satis¯es (PO) and q1 + q2 < M. Then ¯rm i's pro¯t is
¼i = (1 ¡ c)qi. However, setting q0
i = M ¡ qj, ¯rm i obtains ¼0
i = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ qj) >
(1 ¡ c)qi and ¯rm j's pro¯t is una®ected, contradicting (PO).
Now we show that there exists a path ¿s = f1;1;q1;q2g satisfying (PO) and (SP)
if and only if ± ¸ 1
2. There exists such a ¿s if and only if the following conditions are
satis¯ed:
(1 ¡ c)s1 ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2); (11)
(1 ¡ c)s2 ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1); (12)
s1 ¸ M ¡ ^ k2; (13)
s2 ¸ M ¡ ^ k1: (14)
From q1 + q2 ¸ M, we have s2 = M ¡ s1. Substituting for M ¡ s1 in (12) and
rewriting (12) and (13) yields:
± ¸ ±
0(s1) ´
^ k1 ¡ s1




^ k2 ¡ M + s1
^ k1 + ^ k2 ¡ M
: (16)
For a given quantity sold by ¯rm 1, ±0(s1) and ±00(s1) de¯ne lower bounds on the
discount factor for the existence of a SPEP ¿s satisfying (PO) and (SP). Therefore,
if ¯rm 1's sales are given by s1, then ¿s is a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (SP) only if
± ¸ maxf±0;±00g. Since ±0 decreases linearly with s1 and ±00 increases linearly with s1,
we can de¯ne s¤
1 such that ±0(s¤
1) = ±00(s¤
1). It follows that if ± < ±0(s¤
1), there does not
exist s1 such that (11) and (12) are satis¯ed. Therefore, if ± < ±0(s¤
1), there does not
exist a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (SP). Solving for s¤




1 in ±0, we obtain ±0(s¤
1) = 1
2. Consider the path ¿¤ = f(1;1;s¤
1;s¤
2)g.
For every ± ¸ 1
2, ¿¤ is a SPEP that satis¯es (PO) and (SP). The proof that there
exists a SPEP satisfying (PO) and (SP) if, and only if ± ¸ 1
2 is now complete.
We now show that ¿s also satis¯es (C) if, and only if ± ¸ ~ ±. We strengthen (14)
to:
s2 ¸
(M ¡ ^ k2)^ k2
^ k1
: (17)






with at least one strict inequality. It remains to establish that ± ¸ ~ ± is necessary
and su±cient for some ¿s satisfying (PO) and (SP) to also satisfy (C). We have
s¤
1 > M ¡ ^ k2, however, using (17), we obtain s¤





^ k2 if, and only if
^ k2 ¸ 1
2
^ k1. So, ^ k2 < 1
2















^ k2) = 1¡
^ k2
^ k1.
For every ± ¸ 1 ¡
^ k2










^ k2)g is a SPEP that
satis¯es (PO), (C) and (SP). ¤
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2









2) solves the following problem:
max
fp1;p2;q1;q2g
(p2 ¡ c)s2(p1;q1;p2;q2) (18)
subject to (p1 ¡ c)s1(p1;q1;p2;q2) ¸ ¼; (19)
s2(p1;q1;p2;q2) ¸ ®
N
2 ; (4) and (5);
where (1¡c)(M ¡®N
2 ) ¸ ¼ ¸ (1¡c)(M ¡ ^ k2). First, we show that if ¼ is such that
when ¯rms' sales are given by s1 = ¼
1¡c and s2 = M ¡ ¼
1¡c and ¯rms set p1 = p2 = 1
neither (4) nor (5) are binding, the vector (1;q1;1;q2) such that s1(1;q1;1;q2) = ¼
1¡c
and s2(1;q1;1;q2) = M ¡ ¼
1¡c solves (18). Note that given any p1;p2 > c, it is optimal
to set q1 + q2 ¸ M, since if q2 < M ¡ q1, the objective can be increased without
a®ecting ¯rm 1's sales and pro¯t and neither ¯rm's incentive constraints. Therefore,
(PO) implies s2(p1;q1;p2;q2) = M ¡ s1(p1;q1;p2;q2). We solve for s1 from (19)
satis¯ed with equality and substitute for M¡s1 in the objective function. Maximizing
with respect to p1 and p2 yields the unique solution p1 = p2 = 1. Therefore, using
(19), we obtain s1(1;q1;1;q2) = ¼
1¡c, which implies that for such ¼, (1;q1;1;q2) solves
(18) if and only if q1 + q2 ¸ M, s1(1;q1;1;q2) = ¼
1¡c and s2(1;q1;1;q2) = M ¡ ¼
1¡c.
Second, we examine the case in which ¼ · ¼0, where ¼0 is such that if ¯rms set
p1 = p2 = 1 and sell s1 = ¼0
1¡c and s2 = M ¡ ¼0
1¡c, then (4) is binding. By de¯nition of
®1(±), ¼0 ´ (1 ¡ c)®1(±). Furthermore for ¼ < ¼0, (4) does not hold on any path on
which ¯rms set p1 = p2 = 1 and sell s1 = ¼
1¡c and s2 = M ¡ ¼
1¡c. This implies that
if ¼ < ¼0, (4) must be binding at a solution to (18). An argument similar to that
used above establishes that for all ¼ · ¼0, (PO) implies q1 + q2 ¸ M, in which case
s1 + s2 = M. For given prices and quantities, both ¯rms' sales are then uniquely







2) 2 A1 (we show below that the latter does hold). Solving for s1 from
(4), setting s2 = M ¡ s1 and substituting for s2 in the objective of (18), it must be




2) solves the following problem:
maxfp1;p2g (p2 ¡ c)
Ã
M ¡




subject to (1 ¡ ±)(p2 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) ¸ ¼ and (5):
31Note that the objective function is strictly increasing in p1. We now show that p0
1 = 1
must hold. Suppose p0
1 < 1, then, since the objective function is strictly increasing










1) + ±(M ¡ ^ k1): (21)
However, we have shown above that f(1;M ¡ ®2(±);1;®2(±))g is a SPEP on which
¼1(1;M ¡ ®2(±);1;®2(±)) ¸ ¼ and:
¼2(1;M ¡ ®2(±);1;®2(±)) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1) > (p
0
2 ¡ c)s2;





2) solves (18). Hence, p0










2) = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®2(p0
2)), by de¯nition of ®2(p2). Therefore, the
only constraint left is (1 ¡ ±)(p0
2 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) ¸ ¼. If ¼ is such that
the latter constraint is binding, p0
2 is uniquely de¯ned by (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®2(p0
2)) = ¼.
From the latter inequality, it is easy to see that p0
2 decreases as ¼ decreases since
M ¡®2(p2) is increasing in p2. We now determine the lowest such p0
2 ¯rm 2 ever sets
on a SPEP satisfying (PO). This price, which we denote by p¤
2 is the solution to the
¯rst order condition to (20) assuming (5) and the remaining constraint hold:
(1 ¡ c)M ¡ 2(1 ¡ ±)(p
¤




2(1¡±)^ k1 + c.19 If there is no interior solution for which
p¤
2 · 1, then the solution is a corner solution at p¤
2 = 1. We have thus shown that
if ± ¸ ~ ±, there exists p¤
2 such that for all pc
2 2 [minfp¤
2;1g;1], there exists a path
¿c = f(1;M ¡ ®2(pc
2);pc
2;®2(pc
2)g that satis¯es (PO) and (C).
It remains to show that (pc
2;®2(pc
2)) 2 A1;8pc
2 2 P c
2: If minfp¤
2;1g = 1, this is obvi-
ous. Suppose minfp¤
2;1g = p¤





2 2 P c
2. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction that (pc
2;®2(pc
2)) = 2 A1. By de¯nition of
®2(pc
2):
(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®2(p
c
2)) = (1 ¡ ±)(p
c
2 ¡ c)k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2): (23)
By the de¯nition of A1, if (pc
2;®2(pc
2)) = 2 A1:




2 ¡ c)^ k1:
Thus, from (23) and the fact that ± 2 (0;1), it follows that:
(p
c
2 ¡ c)^ k1 < (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2):
Hence, using the de¯nition of p
1, pc
2 < p
1 < 1 must hold. Thus p
1 2 P c
2. We show
that this is is impossible. From p¤
2 · pc
2 < 1 and the fact that for [p¤
2;1], p2®2(p2)
19The second order condition is ¡2(1 ¡ ±)^ k1 < 0.
32increases as p2 decreases, we have (p¤
2 ¡ c)®2(p¤
2) ¸ (p2 ¡ c)®2(p2) > (1 ¡ c)®2(±) ¸
¼N
2 = (p
1 ¡ c)^ k2 for every p2 2 P c
2. Thus, at every p2 2 [p¤
2;1), ¯rm 2 obtains a
payo® strictly greater than the maximum it can obtain by setting p
1. Firm 1 obtains
a payo® (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®2(p2)) that is no less than (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2), the maximum
payo® it can obtain when ¯rm 2 sells its capacity at p
1. Hence, by (PO), p
1 = 2 P c
2, a
contradiction. Therefore, if pc




Therefore, for ± ¸ ~ ±, we have established that for all values of ¯rm 1's payo®s
in an interval, ¼ 2 [(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®2(minfp¤
2;1g);(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ maxf®N
2 ;®2(±)g], there
exists a unique pc
2 in an interval P c
2 ´ [minfp¤




(18) if and only if qc
1 + qc
2 ¸ M, and sales satisfy s1(1;pc
2;qc
1;qc
















2) ¸ ®1(±) for pc
2 = 1. Therefore, there exists a unique SPEP that
achieves payo®s (¼;V2), where V2 is the value of the objective function at a solution
to (18) given ¼ 2 [(1¡c)(M ¡®2(minfp¤
2;1g);(1¡c)(M ¡maxf®N
2 ;®2(±)g]. Hence,
all such SPEP satisfy (PO). Moreover, note that ¯rm 2's minimum payo® on such
SPEP is (1 ¡ c)®N
2 = ¼N
2 and ¯rm 1's payo® is strictly greater than ¼N
1 . Thus all
such SPEP satisfy (C) as well.
To complete the proof of the proposition, we must show that ¯rm 1 cannot obtain
a payo® greater than (1 ¡ c)®1(±) on a SPEP that satis¯es (PO) and (C). To this








2) = M ¡ ¼00
1¡c. This clearly implies ¼00 ´ (1¡c)®1(±), by de¯nition of
®1(±). Thus it follows that if ¼ > ¼00, (5) does not hold on any path f(1;q0
1;1;q0
2)g for
which s1(1;q1;1;q2) = ¼
1¡c and s2(1;q1;1;q2) = M ¡ ¼
1¡c. Therefore, for all ¼ > ¼00,
in any solution to (18), it must be the case that p1 < 1. Indeed, let ¼ > ¼00 and
suppose p1 = 1, then s2 = M¡
®1(±)
p1¡c, and p1 = 1 imply that (p2¡c)s2 is maximized at
p2 = 1, where s2 = ®2(±), contradicting the fact that (19) holds. We now show that
¼00 = (1 ¡ c)®1(±) is the maximum pro¯t attainable by ¯rm 1 on a SPEP satisfying
(PO). If this is not the case, then there exists a SPEP f(p1;q1;p2;q2)g satisfying (PO)
for which p1 < 1 and (p1¡c)s1 > ¼00 = (1¡±)®1(±) = ±(1¡c)^ k1+(1¡±)(1¡c)(M¡^ k2).
Suppose such a SPEP exists. It is clear that on a SPEP, if ¯rms set prices p1 > c
and p2 > c, the maximum amount of sales s1 ¯rm 1 can obtain is M ¡ s2, where s2
is the solution in s2 to ¯rm 2's incentive compatibility constraint (5) satis¯ed with




[(1 ¡ ±)(p1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1)]:
Thus, s1 is strictly increasing in p2. Therefore, to maximize ¯rm 1's sales, set p2 = 1.
Now, maximizing (p1¡c)s1 with respect to p1 yields the ¯rst order condition, satis¯ed
at an interior solution p¤
1 < 1:
(1 ¡ c)M ¡ 2(1 ¡ ±)(p
¤
1 ¡ c)^ k2 ¡ ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1) = 0 (24)
33But from ± ¸ ~ ±, it follows that the LHS of (24) is always strictly positive, so that the
solution is rather a corner solution, p¤
1 = 1, thus yielding a contradiction. But then,
(p¤
1 ¡ c)s1 = (1 ¡ c)®1(±). Since ¯rm 1 cannot obtain a greater pro¯t on a path on
which both p1 < 1 and p2 < 1, we have shown that ¯rm 1's pro¯t on a SPEP that
satis¯es (PO) and (C) is less than or equal to (1 ¡c)®1(±), which is what we had to
prove. ¤
8.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the case ^ k1 = ^ k2 = M. By Proposition 1, ¡(k1;k2;c) and GE(k1;k2;c)
have identical distributions of prices and sales and it is straightforward to show that
setting p1 = p2 = c and q1 = q2 = M is a pure strategy equilibrium in the one-shot
game providing each ¯rm its security level, ¼i(c;c;M;M) = 0, i = 1;2. Repeating
this one-shot equilibrium provides the desired path.
Suppose k2 < M. We begin by showing that if there exists a pure strategy two-
phase perfect equilibrium punishment path that forces the large ¯rm down to its
security level, then there also exists a pure strategy two-phase perfect equilibrium
security level punishment for the small ¯rm. Then we show that such a two-phase
perfect equilibrium security level punishment indeed exists for the large ¯rm.
Consider the following punishment path ¿s
2 for the small ¯rm. In the ¯rst period,
¯rm 1 sets a price equal to p





2 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)®2(±) = ¼2 (25)
and 0· ps
2 < p
2, and a quantity ceiling equal to ^ k2. We show below that such a
price ps
2 exists. After the ¯rst period and assuming no deviation, ¯rms revert to
the stationary path f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g from period 2 on. Firm 2's deviations are
punished by restarting ¿s
2. We assume that there exists a perfect equilibrium security
level punishment path for ¯rm 1. We show that under the stated assumptions, the
path ¿s
2 is a security level perfect equilibrium punishment path for the small ¯rm.
We ¯rst show that there exists a unique price ps
2 satisfying (25) and 0· ps
2 < p
2.
Since ^ k2 > 0, the price ps
2 de¯ned by (25) is unique. Furthermore, since ®2(±) >
M ¡ ^ k1 and (p
2 ¡c)^ k2 ´ (1¡c)(M ¡ ^ k1) = ¼2, ps
2 < p
2. Finally, ps
2 ¸ 0 follows from
the assumption c ¸ ^ c.
Next, we show that ¯rms' incentive constraints are satis¯ed in the ¯rst period of
¿s
2. First, note that ¯rm 2's incentive constraint in the ¯rst period is given by (25)
and is therefore satis¯ed by de¯nition of ps
2. Second, since we assumed that there
exists a security level perfect equilibrium punishment path for ¯rm 1, its incentive
constraint in the ¯rst period of ¿s
2 is given by:
(1 ¡ ±)(p
2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) + ±(1 ¡ c)®1(±) ¸ ¼1: (26)
34Solving for ^ k2 in (26), we obtain that (26) is satis¯ed if and only if:




1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ±)
¾
: (27)
We now show that on ¿s
2, both ¯rms' incentive constraints are satis¯ed from
period 2 on. Since ¯rm 2's deviations are punished by restarting ¿s
2, using (25), ¯rm
2's incentive constraint in any period of the stationary path f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g is:
(1 ¡ c)®2(±) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±¼2:
Since ¼2 = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1), for ± ¸ 1
2, the above incentive constraint is satis¯ed by
de¯nition of ®2(±).
Since ¯rm 1 is punished down to its security level if it deviates, ¯rm 1's incentive
constraint in any period of the stationary path f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g is:
(1 ¡ c)®1(±) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±¼1:
Since ¼1 = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2), for ± ¸ 1
2, the above incentive constraint is satis¯ed by
de¯nition of ®1(±).
Thus we have established that under the stated assumptions, all incentive con-
straints are satis¯ed on the path ¿s
2. Thus ¿s
2 is a 2-phase perfect equilibrium security
level punishment path for the small ¯rm.
We now turn to the large ¯rm's punishment. Consider the following path, ¿s0
1 ,
constructed in a manner similar to ¯rm 2's punishment above. In the ¯rst period,
¯rm 2 sets a price equal to p





1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)®1(±) = ¼1; (28)
and 0 · ps
1 · p
2, and a quantity ceiling equal to ^ k1. We show below that such
a price ps
1 exists. From the second period on, ¯rms revert to the stationary path
f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g. We assume that ¯rm 1's deviations are punished by restarting
¿s0
1 in the ¯rst period and that ¯rm 2's deviations are punished by reverting to ¿s
2.






1 is a 2-phase perfect
equilibrium security level punishment path for ¯rm 1.
We begin by deriving a condition under which there exists a unique price ps
1
satisfying (28) and 0 · ps
1 < p
2. First, since ^ k1 > 0, if such a price ps
1 exists, it is
unique. Second, it is simple to check that if c ¸ ^ c, ps
1 solving (28) satis¯es ps
1 ¸ 0.
Finally, straightforward computations yield that ps
1 solving (28) also satis¯es ps
1 · p
2
if and only if ^ k2 ¸ ^ k1=(1+±), with equality in one of these inequalities if and only if
there is equality in the other.
We now show that ¯rm 2's incentive constraint is satis¯ed in the ¯rst period
of ¿s0
1 . Since ¯rm 2's deviations are punished by reverting to ¿s
2, ¯rm 2's incentive
35constraint in the ¯rst period of ¿s0
1 is:
(1 ¡ ±)(p
1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1) + ±(1 ¡ c)®2(±) ¸ ¼2; (29)
which, after solving for ^ k1, is equivalent to:




1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ±)
¾
: (30)
If the minimum in the bracketed expression in (30) is obtained at ^ k2, the inequality
holds from the assumption k1+k2 > M. If the minimum in the bracketed expression
in (30) is not obtained at ^ k2, the inequality holds since by assumption ^ k1 ¸ ^ k2 ¸
ª(k1;±). Furthermore, ¯rm 1's constraint in the ¯rst period is given by (28) and is
therefore satis¯ed by de¯nition of ps
1.
Finally, we show that on ¿s0
1 , both ¯rms' incentive constraints are satis¯ed from
period 2 on. Since ¯rm 2's deviations are punished by restarting ¿s
2, ¯rm 2's incentive
constraint in any period of the stationary path f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g is:
(1 ¡ c)®2(±) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±¼2:
Since ¼2 = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1), for ± ¸ 1
2, the above incentive constraint is satis¯ed by
de¯nition of ®2(±).
Since ¯rm 1's deviations are punished by restarting ¿s0
1 in the ¯rst period, ¯rm
1's incentive constraint in any period of the stationary path f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g is:
(1 ¡ c)®1(±) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±¼1:
Since ¼1 = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2), for ± ¸ 1
2, the above incentive constraint is satis¯ed by
de¯nition of ®1(±).





, we have constructed a perfect equilibrium
punishment path on which the large ¯rm obtains its security level.
To complete the proof that under the assumptions of the proposition, there exists
a 2-phase perfect equilibrium punishment that drives the large ¯rm down to its







We will show that the following path ¿s00
1 is a 2-phase perfect equilibrium security
level punishment path for the large ¯rm. In the ¯rst period, ¯rm 1 sets a price equal
to p
2 and a quantity ceiling equal to ^ k1 (but sells to residual demand only). From
the second period on, ¯rm 1 sets a price equal to 1 and a quantity ceiling equal to
qs
1 2 [®1(±);®1(±)], where qs






2 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ q
s
1) ¸ ¼2; (31)
and 0 · p
p
2 < p
2, and a quantity ceiling equal to ^ k2. From the second period on, ¯rm
2 sets a price equal to 1 and a quantity ceiling equal to M ¡qs
1. Firm 1's deviations
36are punished by restarting ¿s00
1 in the ¯rst period and ¯rm 2's deviations are punished
by reverting to ¿s
2.
To demonstrate that the path ¿s00
1 satis¯es the required conditions, we ¯rst show
that there exists a quantity ceiling qs
1 such that if on ¿s00
1 , ¯rm 1 sells to residual
demand at p
2 in the ¯rst period, and from the second period on, ¯rms revert to the
stationary path f(1;1;qs
1;M ¡qs
1)g, ¯rm 1 obtains the payo® ¼1. From the argument




2 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)®1 = ¼1:




2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) + ±(1 ¡ c)®1 · ¼1: (32)
with equality if and only if ^ k2 =
^ k1
1+± and p
2 = c. Moreover, by de¯nition of ª(k1;±),
we have
(1 ¡ ±)(p
2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) + ±(1 ¡ c)®1 ¸ ¼1;
Thus it follows from the strict monotonicity and continuity of the left-hand side




2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2) + ±(1 ¡ c)q
s
1 = ¼1:
This is the required quantity ceiling.
Now we show that there exists p
p










2 satis¯es (31) and since qs
1 < ^ k1 and (p
2¡c)^ k2 ´ (1¡c)(M¡^ k1) = ¼2,
we have pr
2 < p













2 ¸ 0, we are ¯nished. If not, then pr
2 < 0. It then follows from the
de¯nition of pr
2 and the fact that ^ k2 is strictly greater than zero that:
(1 ¡ ±)(0 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ q
s
1) > ¼2:
Hence, it follows from 0 < ^ c · c · p
2, that setting p
p
2 = 0, p
p




2. Therefore we have shown that there exists a price p
p
2 satisfying (31)




Finally, we show that on ¿s00
1 , both ¯rms' incentive constraints are satis¯ed from
period 2 on. Since ¯rm 2's deviations are punished by reverting to ¿s
2, ¯rm 2's
incentive constraint in any period of the stationary path f(1;1;qs
1;M ¡ qs
1)g is:
(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ q
s
1) ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1):
37To show that the above constraint is satis¯ed, note that since qs
1 · ®1(±), M ¡ qs
1 ¸
M ¡ ®1(±) = ®2(±). Thus
(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ q
s
1) ¸ (1 ¡ c)®2(±) = (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k2 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1);
where the last inequality follows from the de¯nition of ®2(±). Therefore, ¯rm 2's
incentive constraint is satis¯ed.
Since ¯rm 1's deviations are punished by restarting ¿s00
1 in the ¯rst period, ¯rm





1 ¸ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2):




1 ¸ (1 ¡ c)®1(±) = (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k2);
where the last inequality follows from the de¯nition of ®1(±). Therefore, ¯rm 1's
incentive constraint is satis¯ed.
Hence, we have shown that all incentive constraints hold by construction in every
period of the path ¿s00
1 . Therefore ¿s00
1 is a pure strategy 2-phase perfect equilibrium
security level punishment path for ¯rm 1.
Letting ¿s
1 = ¿s0














we have shown that under the stated assumptions, there exists a pure strategy 2-
phase perfect equilibrium security level punishment path ¿s
1 for the large ¯rm.
Thus, under the assumptions of the proposition, there exist pure strategy perfect
equilibrium punishment paths for both ¯rms. ¤
8.5 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is by construction. We construct a single perfect equilibrium path ¿s on
which both ¯rms obtain their security level. We construct ¿s in the following way:
in the ¯rst period, ¯rm 1 sets a price ps
1 satisfying 0 · ps
1 · p
2 and o®ers its capacity.






1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)q
s
1 = (1 ¡ c)(M ¡ k2) = ¼1: (33)
and qs
1 2 [®1(±);®1(±)]. We show below that such ps
1 and qs
1 exist.
In the ¯rst period of ¿s, ¯rm 2 sets a price ps
2, and o®ers its capacity. From the
second period on, ¯rm 2 sets its price equal to 1 and o®ers qs
2 = M ¡ qs
1. Suppose
k1 < M and let ps
2 be given by
(1 ¡ ±)(p
s
2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1) + ±(1 ¡ c)q
s




1. We show below that such ps
2 exists. Assume that unilateral
deviations from ¿s are punished by restarting ¿s in the ¯rst period. We now show
that ¿s is a perfect equilibrium path.
First, de¯ne pu
1 to be the unique solution in p1 to:
(1 ¡ ±)(p1 ¡ c)^ k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)®1(±) = ¼1:
The assumption k2 < ª(k1;±), (26) and (27) imply that pu
1 ¸ 0.
Second, let k1 < M, and de¯ne pu
2 to be the unique solution in p2 to:
(1 ¡ ±)(p2 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ k1) + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®1(±)) = ¼2: (35)
Substituting for the value of ®1(±) in both equations and solving for pu
1 and pu
2, we





2 () k1 < [1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ±)]M < M:








2 () k2 ¸
(1 ¡ ±)M
















1 = ®1(±). From the properties of ps
1 and ps
2, we obtain that
each ¯rm's incentive constraint is satis¯ed in period 1. Furthermore, using arguments
similar to those used for the second phase of paths described in Proposition 5, ± ¸ 1
2
and the de¯nition of ®1(±) imply that both ¯rms' incentive constraints are satis¯ed
from period 2 on. Thus for the set of capacity pairs described above, ¿s is a security
level perfect equilibrium path for both ¯rms.
To complete the proof of the proposition, suppose k1 < M=(1+±) in addition to
the assumptions of the proposition. To construct ¿s for such capacity pairs, ¯rst let
^ q2 be the solution in q2 to the following equation:
(1 ¡ ±)(p
1 ¡ c)(M ¡ k1) + ±(1 ¡ c)q2 = ¼2:
Since k1 < M=(1 + ±) by assumption, it follows from (35) and (36) that
(1 ¡ ±)(p
1 ¡ c)(M ¡ k1) + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ®1(±)) < ¼2;
and from k1 ¸ (1 ¡ ±)M=[1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ±)], (29) and (30), it follows that:
(1 ¡ ±)(p
1 ¡ c)(M ¡ k1) + ±(1 ¡ c)®2(±) ¸ ¼2:
39Since M ¡ ®1(±) = ®2(±), we have that ^ q2 2 [®2(±);®2(±)]. Solving for ^ q2 explicitly,
we obtain
^ q2 = (M ¡ k1)
·




Moreover, tedious but straightforward computations show that the following holds
(1 ¡ ±)(p
2 ¡ c)k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ q2) ¸ ¼1
if and only if
k2 ¸
(1 ¡ ±)^ k2
1
^ k1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(M ¡ ^ k1)
:





1 ¡ c)k1 + ±(1 ¡ c)(M ¡ ^ q2) = ¼1;
then p0
1 is such that 0 · p
0
1 · p
2. Therefore, if ª(k1;±) > k2 ¸ [(1¡±)^ k2
1]=[^ k1 ¡(1¡






1 = M ¡ ^ q2, the triple (ps
1;ps
2;qs
1) satis¯es all the required properties.
For both ¯rms, incentive constraints are satis¯ed in period 1. Moreover, from ± ¸ 1
2
and qs
1 2 [®1(±);®1(±)], we obtain that incentive constraints are also satis¯ed from
period 2 on.
Therefore, letting ¿s
i = ¿s for i = 1;2, we have shown that under the assumptions
of the proposition, there exists a perfect equilibrium security level punishment path
¿s
i for i = 1;2. ¤
8.6 Capacity Utilization
In this section of the Appendix, we characterize the pattern of capacity utilization,
Ui ´
si
ki, i = 1;2, on constrained Pareto optimal collusive SPEP's.
Lemma 2 Suppose A1 holds. Let ¿s be a SPEP satisfying (PO). For every ± such
that ± ¸ 1
2, the small ¯rm has a higher capacity utilization than the large ¯rm on ¿s
if and only if s2 ¸
k2M
k1+k2.
Proof. From Proposition 2, we have that if ¿s satis¯es (PO), then on ¿s, s1+s2 = M.




k2. Rearranging this inequality yields
s2 ¸
k2M
k1+k2, which proves the lemma. ¤
Lemma 3 Suppose A1 holds. For every ± such that ± ¸ ~ ±,
40(i) On the SPEP ¿1(±), U1 < U2 if and only if one of the following conditions
holds:
k1 ¸ k2 ¸ M and ± <
k1
k1+k2,





2M;M), k1 2 [2M ¡ k2;M +
k2
2
M¡k2] and ± < 1 ¡ M
k1+k2,
(ii) On the SPEP ¿2(±), U2 < U1 if and only if one of the following conditions
holds:
k2 < M, k1 < M ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2 and ± <
^ k1
k1+k2,
k2 < M, k1 ¸ M ¡
(M¡k2)2












Proof. From Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, we have ¿1(±) = f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g if
~ ± = 1
2 and 1
2 · ± ·
k2
^ k1, ¿1(±) = f(1;1;M ¡ ®N
2 ;®N
2 )g if ± ¸
k2
^ k1. If ~ ± = 1 ¡
k2
^ k1,
¿1(±) = f(1;1;M ¡ ®N
2 ;®N
2 )g for all ± ¸ ~ ±.
To prove the ¯rst statement in (i), note that ^ k1 = ^ k2 = M implies ~ ± = 1
2 and
k2
^ k1 = 1. Therefore ¿1(±) = f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±)g and s2 = ®2(±). Using the de¯nition
of ®2(±) yields ®2(±) = (1 ¡ ±)M = s2 >
k2M




¯rst part of (i) then follows from Lemma 2.
We now prove the second statement in (i). First note that since ¿1(±) satis¯es
(C), for every ± ¸ ~ ±, on ¿1(±), s2 ¸ ®N











Thus if k1 > M +
k2
2
M¡k2, the fact that s2 ¸ ®N
2 , the above equation and Lemma 2
imply that on ¿1(±), U1 < U2. This proves the second statement.
To prove the third statement, assume M · k1 · M +
k2
2
M¡k2. From the second




M, then U1 ¸ U2 since in this case, s2 = ®N
2 .
Therefore, if U1 < U2 occurs on ¿1(±) for the capacity pairs described in the third
statement, it must be the case that s2 = ®2(±). If k2 < 1
2M, then ~ ± = 1 ¡
k2
^ k1,
thus, on ¿1(±), for every ± ¸ ~ ±, s2 = ®N
2 . It then follows immediately that U1 ¸







k2(k1 + k2 ¡ M)
(^ k1 + k2 ¡ M)(k1 + k2)
: (37)
Substituting for ^ k1 = M in (37) and using Lemma 2, we obtain that U1 < U2 on
¿1(±) if and only if ~ ± · ± < 1 ¡ M
k1+k2 holds. We now ¯nd conditions under which
1 ¡ M
k1+k2 > ~ ±. Since k2 ¸ 1
2M, ~ ± = 1
2. We have 1 ¡ M
k1+k2 > 1
2 = ~ ± if and only
41if k1 > 2M ¡ k2 > M. Thus, on ¿1(±), if M > k2 ¸ 1
2M, U1 < U2 if and only if
k1 > 2M ¡ k2 and ~ ± · ± < 1 ¡ M
k1+k2 hold. This completes the proof of the third
statement of (i).
We now prove (ii). To this e®ect, we consider two cases depending on the value
of ±: ± ¸ ±r and ~ ± · ± < ±r. First, if ± ¸ ±r, it follows from Propositions 2 and






^ k1(k1 + k2) ¡ k1M
(^ k1 + k2 ¡ M)(k1 + k2)
: (38)
The second inequality in (38) reduces to ± < M
k1+k2 =
^ k1




k1+k2 if ^ k1 < M. Using Proposition 3, if ^ k1 ·
M+^ k2
2 , then ± ¸ ~ ± implies
± ¸ ±r. Straightforward computations yield
k1
k1+k2(> ~ ±) if and only if k1 > M ¡ k2,
which holds by assumption. Therefore, it follows from the above argument that if
(a) ^ k1 ·
M+^ k2
2 , then on ¿2(±), U2 < U1 if and only if ± <
k1
k1+k2(> ~ ±) holds.
Now assume ^ k1 >
M+^ k2
2 . From Proposition 3, ±r > ~ ± holds. If ± ¸ ±r, from
Propositions 2 and 3, ¿2(±) = f(1;1;®1(±);®2(±))g. Hence, arguments developed
above for the case ^ k1 ·
M+^ k2
2 apply. Furthermore, straightforward computations
yield that ±r <
k1
k1+k2 if and only if k1 > M ¡ k2, which holds by assumption. It
follows that if (b) ^ k1 >
M+^ k2








2))g. Therefore on ¿2(±), s2 = ®2(p¤




2 yields s2 =
M¡±(M¡k2)
2 . We have:















If ±c < ~ ±, we are ¯nished. We derive conditions under which ±c ¸ ~ ± holds. First,
straightforward computations show that 1 ¡
k2
^ k1 · ±c < ±r for every capacity pair.
Thus, if ~ ± = 1 ¡
k2
^ k1 > 1
2, ±c ¸ ~ ± holds. Second, suppose ~ ± = 1
2 ¸ 1 ¡
k2
^ k1 holds. Note
that since ^ k1 > M
2 , this implies k2 > 1
3M. Moreover, ±c ¸ 1
2 if and only if:




Straightforward computations yield maxfM ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2 ;M ¡k2g = M ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2 if and
only if k2 ¸ 1
3M. Therefore, we have shown that if (c) k1 >
M+^ k2
2 and ~ ± · ± < ±r,
then on ¿2(±), U2 < U1 if and only if either k1 < M ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2 or k1 ¸ M ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2
and ± 2 (±c;±r) hold. Finally, it is simple to show that for k1 > M ¡k2, which holds





42Therefore, if k1 < M ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2 , it follows from (a), (b) and (c) that on ¿2(±),
U2 < U1 if and only if ± <
k1
k1+k2. Finally, from (b) and (c), it follows that on ¿2(±),
if k1 ¸ M ¡
(M¡k2)2
M+k2 , U2 < U1 if and only if ± 2 (±c;
k1
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Figure 1: Frontier of payo®s attainable on constrained Pareto optimal SPEP for
some ± 2 [~ ±;±r) and
M+^ k2
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Figure 2: Firm 1's range of sales on constrained Pareto optimal SPEP for di®erent
values of ± and
M+^ k2
2 < ^ k1 · 2^ k2.
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